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Abstract 
Limited attention being given to establish and implement Company operational-level grievance 
mechanisms (“OLGMs”), has increasingly hindered the right to effective remedies to victims of human 
rights abuses linked to oil and gas companies in South Sudan. This study examines how oil and gas 
companies can establish and implement in the context of South Sudan, effective OLGMs 
‘administered by the companies alone’.  
 
Internationally, the UN Guiding Principles (“UNGP”), confirmed corporations’ responsibility to establish 
effective OLGMs. The international responsibility equally applies to oil and gas corporations in South 
Sudan. Nationally, the South Sudan’s Petroleum Act 2012 requires setting ‘dispute resolution 
mechanisms’, construed to include OLGMs analogous to the UNGP’s. The call and standards for 
having OLGMs thus, exist under the UNGP and Petroleum Act.  
 
Using an analysis of primary and secondary sources, and best practices guidelines, the study reveals 
that the companies can achieve having and operating OLGMs through five essential phases, 
commencing with the phase of considering key issues, and ending with implementing. The phases 
are potentially realisable to companies of all sizes with minimum resources. Compliance with 
normative standards is achieved by reflecting the standards within the processes through articulation 
of action-guidance. Such creation arguably provides a more functional OLGMs because of the binding 
nature of national law and influential nature of international norms. 
 
In realising the processes, the companies and users may respectively experience resources 
constraint and the barrier of accessing other mechanisms, that may affect the mechanism’s 
effectiveness unless addressed. The study recommends the mechanism be set within a company’s 
unit than setting to minimise resources burden, and access to alternative grievance mechanisms be 
guaranteed in the mechanism’s governance framework to mitigate against using the mechanism as a 
primary and final channel to resolve grievances. 
 
The study firmly answered the question regarding how the oil and gas companies can achieve 
OLGMs  in harmony with the required standards in the context of South Sudan. It contributes to 
ensuring access to effective remedies. Further studies are needed to examine OLGMs administered 
in collaboration with other stakeholders. 
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CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION; EFFORTS TO ENSURE CORPORATE ACCOUNTABILITY  
1.0. The Background of the study 
Company-level grievance mechanisms, commonly known as operational-level grievance mechanisms 
(“OLGMs”), are a crucial part of the right to effective remedies which complement and supplement 
judicial mechanisms to ensure corporate accountability for business-related human rights abuses.1 
Under international law, the obligation to provide remedies lies directly with the State as part of its 
obligation to protect against human rights abuses by third parties, including corporations.2 However, it 
is acceptable under international law for States, through domestic law, to impose legal obligation on 
corporations to provide remedies to those affected by their activities.3 Reliance on the States to 
establish or enforce national legislation to ensure corporate accountability for human rights abuses 
has increasingly proved less effective. Some States are unwilling or unable to enforce or enact the 
legislation because of ‘maintaining and attracting investments in their economies; complex structure 
of certain corporations; high-level corruption;’4 or ‘investments agreements which may freeze the 
application of national legal regime.’5  
 
The helplessness of international law to directly hold corporations accountable for human rights 
abuses prompted a move for a significant period at the international level to develop measures that 
could guarantee corporate accountability in the context of business activities and redress for victims.6 
Cathal Doyle (2015) explained that the concerns by then were whether corporations have, or should 
have, legal obligations to respect human rights, and whether “legally binding” obligations are 
necessary to guarantee corporate respect for human rights and redress for corporate human rights 
                                                 
1 Alex Newton, The Business of Human Rights: Best Practice and the Un Guiding Principles (Routledge 2019) 
116. 
2 Livio Zilli, The Right to a Remedy and to Reparation for Gross Human Rights Violations: A Practitioners Guide 
No.2  (ICJ Geneva 2018)15. 
3 Rodley Nigel, ‘Non-state actors and human rights’ in Scott Sheeran and Nigel Rodley (eds), Routledge 
Handbook of International Human Rights Law (Routledge 2014) 537. 
4 Skinner Gwynne, ‘Rethinking Limited Liability of Parent Corporations for Foreign Subsidiaries' Violations of 
International Human Rights Law’ (2015) 72 Wash. & Lee L. Rev.1769, 1801-1802. 
5Gehne Katja and Romulo Brillo, Stabilization clauses in international investment law: beyond balancing and fair 
and equitable treatment (Martin Luther University Halle-Wittenberg 2017) 6. 
6 Doyle Cathal M. (ed), Indigenous Peoples’ Experiences with Access to Remedy. Case Studies from Africa, Asia 
and Latin America (2015) 28. 
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abuses.7 Following a considerable period, the Norms on the Responsibilities of Transnational 
Corporations and Other Business Enterprises with Regard to Human Rights (the ‘Norms’) were 
drafted in 1999, which sought to place direct obligation on corporations akin to the State’s  obligations 
under international law. Article 1 of the Norms expected corporations to ‘promote, secure, respect, 
and protect human rights recognised in international and national law. In 2004, the UN Commission 
on Human Rights considered and described the Norms as containing useful ideas for reflection, 
however the Commission disapproved of the Norms on the basis that they ‘lacked legal standing.’8 
After the flop of the Norms, Professor John Ruggie was appointed in 2005 to be the Special 
Representative of the UN Secretary-General on business and human rights.  In 2008, John Ruggie 
introduced the UN “Protect, Respect and Remedy” Framework (“the UN Framework”), that contains 
three pillars: The State Duty to Protect, the Corporate Responsibility to Respect, and Access to 
Remedy. The UN Framework received greater acceptance because of its consistency with the 
principles of international law.9 In June 2011, the UN Human Rights Council through a resolution 
solidly sanctioned the UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights (“ the UNGP”) to guide 
the implementation of the three pillars of the UN Framework. 
 
Among others, the UN Framework and the UNGP confirm that corporations have the responsibility to 
respect the internationally recognized human rights.10 This confirmation is consistent with the human 
rights responsibility of ‘every organ of society’ referred to, in the preamble of the 1948 Universal 
Declaration on Human Rights (UDHR).11  
 
However, the argument against the UNGP is that it is a ‘soft-law instrument that lacks the force of 
law.12 Nevertheless, together with the UN Framework, they echo the most current findings and 
conclusions of the corporate accountability in the context of business activities internationally.13 The 
                                                 
7 Cathal (n 6). 
8 ECOSOC Decision 2004/279, para.(c). 
9 Osiemo Lynette, ‘Securing corporate accountability for violation of human rights: towards a legal and policy 
framework for Kenya’ (DPhil diss, Univ. of the Witwatersrand 2016)15. 
10 Principle 12. 
11 Cathal (n 6) 28. 
12 Deva Surya and David Bilchitz (eds), Human rights obligations of business: beyond the corporate responsibility 
to respect? (Cambridge University Press 2013) 144.  
13 Lynette (n 9)15. 
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UNGP is credited as an influential ‘authority of normative value’ which is consistent with the principles 
of international law.14  
1.1. Application of the corporate responsibility to the Oil and Gas Companies  
The corporate responsibility to respect human rights, applies to all companies world-wide.15 As such, 
the responsibility applies to oil and gas corporations operating anywhere (including South Sudan). 
The responsibility is relevant to the companies because their activities can lead to realisation as well 
as violation of the internationally recognised human rights. A study indicates that whereas the 
economic investments of oil and gas companies significantly contribute to development in a country 
through the provision of energy and revenue, which in turn leads to realisation of human rights, their 
operations also lead to environment destruction and human rights abuses.16  
 
Despite the adverse human rights impacts linked to oil and gas companies, oil-rich countries tend to 
encourage petroleum companies to invest in their countries in the hope of improving their economy.17 
South Sudan, for instance, like other oil-rich nations, upon gaining independence from Sudan in 2011, 
prioritised investments in her oil industry. It is reported that some of the major oil companies that have 
invested in the country’s oil industry in a joint venture with the State-owned Nile Petroleum 
Corporations, are the Malaysian oil company Petronas, China national petroleum corporation, and the 
India’s oil and natural gas corporation.18 A study demonstrates that while the investments in the oil 
sector contributes to about 95% of country’s revenue, the oil or petroleum activities have also caused 
and continue to cause environmental pollution which result to abuses of the internationally recognised 
human rights.19 The adverse consequences of the petroleum activities have been “causing mistrust 
and deep resentment against oil companies in many oil-rich parts of South Sudan,” yet less or no 
                                                 
14 Surya and Bilchitz (n 12) 144.  
15 Commentary to Principle 11. 
16 SHIFT and IHRB, Oil and Gas Sector Guide on Implementing the UN Guiding Principles on Business  and 
Human Rights ( European Commission 2011) 8 <https://www.ihrb.org/pdf/eu-sector-guidance/EC-
Guides/O&G/EC-Guide_O&G.pdf> accessed 14 August 2019. 
17 Shinsato Alison, ‘Increasing the accountability of transnational corporations for environmental harms: The 
petroleum industry in Nigeria’  (2005) 4 Nw. Univ. J. Int'l Hum. Rts.186, 187. 
18 Cumming-Bruce, ‘Oil Companies May Be Complicit in Atrocities in South Sudan, U.N. Panel Says’ The New 
York Times (New York, 20 February 2019) <www.nytimes.com/2019/02/20/world/africa/south-sudan-oil-war-
crimes.html> accessed 20 August 2019. 
19 Moro L., J. A. Akec, and M. B. Bol, ‘Scrutiny of South Sudan’s oil industry: Community relations, labour 
practices and impact on land use patterns’ (ECOS and PAX 2014) 13. 
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efforts are made by the corporations to remediate the adverse impacts.20 It is the intention of the 
responsibility to respect human rights, and the remedy pillar under the UNGP, that such adverse 
corporate human rights impacts are remediated.  
 
1.2. Legal obligation under national law 
Under Article 172(2)(n) of the Transitional Constitution of the Republic of South Sudan, 2011 (as 
amended), it is required that petroleum and gas development and management be guided by the 
principle that ensures accountability for violations of human rights and degradation to the environment 
caused by petroleum and gas-related operations. As part of the means to achieve the accountability, 
section 94 (1) of the Petroleum Act 2012 (Laws of South Sudan), requires the corporations contracted 
by the government to deal in petroleum activities, to establish a dispute resolution mechanism to 
address grievances against the corporations, in accordance with the regulations.  
 
The regulations referred to under the Petroleum Act, are meant to be issued by the Minister 
responsible for petroleum in line with the power to issue regulations under section 99 of the Act. At 
the time of the study, there was no evidence of the regulations in place. However, if the regulations 
were in place, they would reflect the stipulation of section 94 of the Petroleum Act because a 
subsidiary legislation follows the prescription in the parent legislation.  
1.3. Research problem  
It is revealed that through their activities, the oil and gas companies operating in South Sudan 
adversely affect human rights of individuals and communities living around or near the oil fields.21 
Both the UNGP and Petroleum Act require remediation of the adverse business-related impacts 
through effective OLGMs that should be established per the standards of the UNGP, Petroleum Act, 
and other best practice principles. The requirement to establish and implement OLGMs is a fair 
requisition because ‘where there is human rights harm, there should be a remedy.’22 Usefully, OLGMs 
ensure access to effective remedy to victims of business-related human rights abuses.23  
                                                 
20 Moro, Akec and Bol (n 19). 
21 Moro, Akec and Bol (n 19). 
22 The UN Committee on the Rights of the Child, GC  No. 5 (2003), para.24.  
23 Newton (n 1) 116. 
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Despite the invitation of the UNGP and Petroleum Act to establish and implement OLGMs, the 
significance of having OLGMs, and the corporate adverse human rights impacts that necessitate 
remediation, the oil and gas companies in South Sudan have given less or no attention to develop 
and implement the OLGMs. As such, the victims’ right to access to effective is increasingly being 
hindered. A possible reason for the limited attention is limited understanding of how to establish and 
implement the mechanisms. Conceivably, a study which examines this could assist in alleviating the 
challenge. Consequently, this study explores the question: ‘how can the Oil and Gas companies 
establish and implement effective OLGMs in compliance with the standards of the Petroleum Act, the 
UNGP, and other best practice principles in the context of South Sudan?’ The research question is 
answered by identifying and examining the phases or processes through which the companies can 
achieve the creation and operation of the OLGMs in line with the required standards.  
1.4. Significance of the study. 
The study is significant to creating and implementing a complaint resolution mechanisms (OLGMs) 
operated by the companies, crucial to providing access to remedies in cases of human rights abuses 
involving petroleum companies in the context of South Sudan.  
 
The study is useful to the oil and gas corporations to influence performance of their responsibility to 
respect human rights and provide remedies. It is also relevant to the victims of corporate human rights 
harms to realise their right to access to effective remedies. It is also valuable to the Government of 
South Sudan to guide the formulation of the petroleum regulations envisaged under Section 94(1) of 
the Petroleum Act. 
 
It is as well vital to the academicians, professional researchers and the legal fraternity to gain a better 
understanding of company-level grievance mechanisms to address human rights abuses involving 
petroleum industry in the context of South Sudan. Most prominently, the study contributes to the 
global effort to implement the UNGPs as a way to improve access to effective remedies through 
establishing and implementing effective non-State-based grievance mechanisms.  
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1.5. Objectives of the study 
To achieve the main aim of the research, the study: a) explains the standards under the UNGP and 
the Petroleum Act, for creating effective OLGMs; b) reviews the literature relevant to the 
establishment and implementation of OLGMs; c) reviews the right to remedy and OLGMs; d) 
examines the phases or processes involved in establishing and implementing OLGMs; e) articulates 
action-guidance to achieve the required standards in the phases or processes; f) explains the benefits 
and challenges with regards to the mechanisms; and g) develops recommendations to guarantee or 
improve the mechanism’s effectiveness.   
1.6. Methodology 
The methodology of this study is qualitative and legal dogmatic. The study is done by scrutinising 
primary sources relevant to access to remedy and the establishment and implementation of OLGMs. 
The research reviews and applies the provisions of the Transitional Constitution of South Sudan 2011 
(as amended); Petroleum Act 2012; and the main International human rights instruments which South 
Sudan subscribed to honour. Namely: The International Covenant on Civil and political Rights 
(ICCPR), the International Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC), the International Covenant 
on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR), and the Convention against Torture and Other 
Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishments (CAT). 
 
The study is also developed through the examination of secondary sources. These are text books; 
journal articles; case studies, international guiding principles (including the authoritative UNGP); 
General Comments of UN treaty bodies; reports; and study materials conducted in other countries 
relevant to the topic.  The study also relies on guidance practices on OLGMs developed by reputable 
institutions such as the Global Oil and Gas Industry Association for Environmental and Social Issues 
(IPIECA); the Compliance Advisor/Ombudsman (CAO) of the World Bank; the International Council 
on Mining and Metals (ICMM); and the International Finance Corporation (IFC). The guidelines are 
used because of the difficulty to find international standards on the processes involved in establishing 
and implementing OLGMs. The guidelines of the listed institutions represent some of the best 
international practices and their utilisation is consistent with the Petroleum Act which recognises the 
application of highest international standards.   
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1.7. Scope of the study 
The study is restricted to the establishment and implementation of OLGMs administered by the 
company alone. It does not cover OLGMs administered by companies in collaboration with other 
stakeholders because the ‘processes, form, and remedy outcomes’ of such OLGMs may considerably 
differ from the ones administered by the company alone.24  
1.8. Overviews of Chapters 
This study is made of six chapters. Chapter One is the introduction. It presents the background 
information of the study; application of the corporate responsibility to the oil and gas companies; the 
legal obligation of the companies under the national law; significance of the study; objectives of the 
study; the methodology used; scope of the study; and overviews of the chapters. 
 
Chapter Two, presents the literature review to provide theoretical basis of the study. The literature 
review covers: the understanding of OLGMs; OLGM’s resolution approaches; the steps in establishing 
and implementing OLGMs; experiences with regards to the mechanisms; effectiveness criteria of the 
OLGMs; and the justification for OLGMs. 
 
Chapter Three provides the overview of the right to remedy and the OLGMs. It examines the indirect 
obligation of corporations to provide effectives remedies under international law; the corporate 
responsibility to respect human rights and provide remedy under the UNGP; and the standards under 
the UNGP, Petroleum Act, and other best practices for effective OLGMs. The chapter further explains 
the procedural and substantive aspects of the right to remedies, and the relationship between 
remedies and underlying rights. 
 
Chapter Four explores how to establish and implement effective OLGMs in compliances with the 
standards of the Petroleum statute, UNGP, and other best practice principles. It explores five 
essential phases through which it can be achieved. 
 
                                                 
24 Scheltema Martijn, ‘Assessing the effectiveness of remedy outcomes of non-judicial grievance mechanisms’ 
(2013) DQ 190, 190-191. 
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Chapter Five explains the potential benefits of OLGMs, the key possible challenges the companies 
and users may experience in relation to the OLGMs. 
 
Chapter Six concludes the study. It provides the main findings of the research, presents a conclusion, 
recommendations to overcome the challenges under Chapter Five, and potential future research 
areas. 
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CHAPTER TWO: LITERATURE REVIEW 
2.0. Introduction 
There are a large number of studies on OLGMs which cover a wide aspect of OLGMs in different 
contexts. However, this review of literature focuses on five major themes which appear across the 
literature reviewed, and are applicable to the establishment and implementation of OLGMs. The 
themes are: (I) understanding of OLGMs; (II) grievance resolution models of the mechanisms; (III) 
designing and implementing the mechanisms; (IV) experiences with regards to the mechanisms, (V) 
the effectiveness criteria for the mechanisms; (VI) justification for the mechanisms; and a conclusion.  
2.1. The major themes 
I. Understanding company OLGMs 
 
The first key area of this review concerns the definition of OLGMs. Newton Alex (2019) who provided 
research on access to remedy and grievance mechanisms, referred to OLGM as a form of non-State-
based grievance mechanism administered by a business either alone or in collaboration with 
stakeholders, through which grievances are settled.25 While this definition reveals OLGM as a crucial 
process to receive and settle grievances, the definition does not clarify the level at which the 
mechanism could be established and its scope.  
 
However, Knuckey Sarah, and Jenkin Eleanor (2015), whose research concerned Company-created 
remedy mechanisms for serious human rights abuses, offered a comprehensive definition. The 
authors defined the mechanisms as ongoing procedures which can be established at the ‘corporate-
level or project level’ to address ‘low-level’ complaints such as employee complaints, property 
damage, and relocation issues to those harmed by the company’s operations through dialogue and 
flexible dispute resolution (ADR) processes before they escalate.’26 Whereas the work clarifies the 
where to institutionalize OLGMs, the work is criticized for refuting the use of the mechanisms to 
                                                 
25 Ibid (n 1) 116. 
26 Knuckey Sarah and Eleanor Jenkin, ‘Company-created remedy mechanisms for serious human rights abuses: 
a promising new frontier for the right to remedy?’ (2015) 19.6 IJHR 801, 802. 
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remedy grave or widespread human rights impact or abuses, and for suggesting that the mechanisms 
are incapable of being used to address past human rights abuses.’27 The study failed to consider the 
relevance of defining the scope of OLGMs. Christina Hill  (2010), supports that the ability of company-
level mechanisms to address human rights abuses depend on the scope of the mechanisms.28  
 
From the review of the literature, it is drawn that an OLGM is a non-State-based formal channel 
established to resolve disputes between the company and the intended users. The mechanism can 
be instituted at corporate or business site, and the mechanism’s ability to address any nature of 
adverse impacts may depend on its scope.  
 
II. Grievance resolution models of OLGMs 
Knuckey Sarah and Jenkin Eleanor (2015) identified that the best approach to handling grievances 
under the OLGMs is generally through dialogue process and sometimes through ADR processes 
where necessary.29  On dialogue process, the authors concluded that it is the initial approach which 
has the potential to foster affected stakeholder’s trust in the OLGMs.30 However, Emma Wilson 
(2009), argues that the dialogue or ‘decide together’ is not a flawless approach, it may turn oppressive 
where the company suppresses information relevant to the grievance and does not manage the 
complaint transparently and honestly.31 Emma Wilson’s argument signifies that the dialogue approach 
is appropriate in so far as it is meaningfully done. The result of meaningful dialogue as  Doyle Cathal 
(2015) explained, leads to acceptable outcome by both parties.32 
 
Regarding ADR, Karin Lukas, et al. (2016),33 mentioned that ADR is a form of dispute resolution that 
involved the active engagement of the parties involved, encompassing negotiation, mediation and 
                                                 
27 Sarah and Jenkin (n 26) 802. 
28 Hill Christina, ‘Community-Company Grievance Resolution: Guide for the Australian Mining Industry’ (Oxfam 
Australia, Melbourne, Australia 2010) 9. 
29 Sarah and Jenkin (n 26) 802.  
30 Sarah and Jenkin (n 26) 802. 
31 Wilson Emma, ‘Company-led approaches to conflict resolution in the forest sector. Forest Dialogue’ (2009) 44. 
32 Cathal (n 6) 46. 
33 Lukas Karin, et al, Corporate accountability: The role and impact of non-judicial grievance mechanisms 
(Edward Elgar Publishing 2016) 8-9. 
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arbitration.34 The authors indicated that integrating ADR in OLGMs gives the complainant and 
company further opportunity to resolve the grievance or concern in question outside litigation arena 
where the initial dialogue-based approach could not settle the complaint.35 However, the study never 
defined the disadvantages associated with using ADR mechanisms. But, Todd B. Carver and Vondra 
A. Albert (1994) made the arguments against using ADR. They may be unfair especially to the 
complainant where there is power imbalance between the parties, may also produce unsatisfactory 
outcome to either party, and the binding nature of arbitration decisions may encumber the parties 
from proceeding to Court.36  
 
Assessment of the literature points out that dialogue constitutes a primary approach to resolving 
grievances. However, it may fail sometimes. Therefore, there is need to incorporate ADR to provide 
additional fora outside courts. Whereas ADR is not perfect, studies argued that ‘companies can 
overcome the risk associated with ADR through commitment. Consequently, companies that give 
ADR top priority realize immense savings of time, money, and relationships.37 To the victims, ADR 
guarantees access to remedies outside the adversarial, costly, and bureaucratic court systems.38 
 
III. Designing and implementing OLGMs 
The work of Stefan Zagelmeyer, Bianchi Lara, and Shemberg A. R. (2018),  on non-State-based non-
judicial grievance mechanisms, reveals that the initiative to establish and implement company 
mechanism ranges from informal discussions with stakeholders to complaints management, 
resolution, outcome implementation and evaluation procedures.39 The study also revealed that the 
important aspects of the design of mechanism are: defining the scope of the mechanism; determining 
the purpose; and creating the practical processes of the mechanism.40 This study is significant in 
                                                 
34 Karin (n 33) 8-9. 
35Karin (n 33) 8-9. 
36 Carver Todd B., and Albert A. Vondra, ‘Alternative dispute resolution: Why it doesn't work and why it 
does’ (1994) 72 Harvard Business Review 120, 120. 
37 Shavell Steven, ‘Alternative dispute resolution: an economic analysis’ (1995) 24(1) The Journal of Legal 
Studies 1, 3-4. 
38 Karin (n 33) 8-9 
39 Zagelmeyer Stefan, Lara Bianchi, and A. R. Shemberg, ‘Non-state based non-judicial grievance mechanisms 
(NSBGM): An exploratory analysis’ (2019) 21-25. 
40 Stefan, Bianchi, and Shemberg (n 39) 21. 
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showing the outline of the steps and processes. However, the study could have been more 
satisfactory if it were to explain in detail the steps and processes.  
 
However, the leading guidelines of the CAO (2008),41 and the IPIECA (2012)42 and (2015),43 offer 
detail explanation of the steps and processes ranging from initial step to monitoring. But, the CAO and 
IPIECA guidelines provide the information on a general perspective, leaving a knowledge gap in 
establishing and implementing OLGMs in the context of specific countries and local environment. 
Caroline Rees (2008) elucidated, establishment and implementation of OLGMs is a tailored process, 
it must be customized to specific country, culture and stakeholders for which it is designed.44  
 
From the evaluation of the studies, it is apparent that the establishment and implementation of 
OLGMs involve several steps and processes. However, OLGMs must be created and administered in 
the context of a specific business field, country and the local environment. Disregarding the contextual 
factors may result in a poorly established mechanism. The consequences, the UN Interpretive Guide 
(2012) explained, may raise expectations without providing the processes to meet the expectation.45 
 
IV. Experiences with regards to OLGMs 
Studies have revealed both positive and negative experiences with the process and outcome of 
OLGMs. Knuckey Sarah and Jenkin Eleanor (2015), explained that the mechanism allows easy 
accessibility at no cost to complainants and creates the possibility of comparatively speedy and 
effective remedies for the victims who may otherwise have limited access to national or foreign 
                                                 
41 Wildau Susan, et al., ‘A Guide to Designing and Implementing Grievance Mechanisms for Development 
Projects’ (Office of the Compliance Advisor/Ombudsman 2008)<http://www.cao-
ombudsman.org/howwework/advisor/documents/implemgrieveng.pdf> accessed 19 August 2019 
42 IPIECA, ‘Operational-level Grievance Mechanisms: Good Practice Survey’ (London 
2012)<http://www.ipieca.org/resources/good-practice/operational-level-grievance-mechanisms-good-practice-
survey/> accessed 25 August 2019 
43 IPIECA, ‘Community grievance mechanisms in the oil and gas industry; A manual for implementing 
operational-level grievance mechanisms and designing corporate frameworks’ (London 
2015).<http://www.ipieca.org/resources/good-practice/community-grievance-mechanisms-in-the-oil-and-gas-
industry/> accessed on 25 August 2019. 
44 Rees Caroline, ‘Rights-Compatible Grievance Mechanisms: Guidance Tool for Companies and Their 
Stakeholders. Corporate Social Responsibility Initiative’ (Cambridge, MA: John F Kennedy School of Government 
Harvard University 2008) 2. 
45 OHRHC, The Corporate Responsibility to respect human rights; An interpretive Guide (United Nations 
Publications 2012) 74. 
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judicial systems.46 The authors illustrated the positive experience with a type of OLGM established 
and implemented by a Canadian miner, Barrick Gold Corporation at Papua New Guinea (PNG) mine 
in 2012, to remediate cases of sexual violence committed by the company’s security guards and other 
employees. That between 2014 and 2015, about 137 eligible complaints were received, out of which 
119 were settled.47 The authors further reported that  numerous claimants expressed dissatisfaction 
about the monetary compensation offered, arguing that they did not reﬂect the severity of the 
abuses.48  
 
On the negative encounter with the mechanisms, Jonathan Kaufman and McDonnell Katherine 
(2016), voiced that users are often frustrated with OLGMs because the majority of the mechanisms 
are designed and implemented by the target companies themselves, a clear conflict of interest, which 
discredit the independence of the mechanisms.49 The RAID study (2019) on Acacia Mining’s 
grievance mechanism in Tanzania, further detailed the negative experiences. The study illustrated 
that the mechanism was adversarial in its approach to settling disputes in that complainants were 
required to argue and present evidence before the process exclusively controlled by the company. In 
addition, there is no equality of arms; the company controls relevant information but could not share 
with the claimants nor allow claimants to be assisted by lawyers before the mechanism.50   
  
The case studies show the opportunities and challenges associated with the use of OLGMs. The 
opportunities are important to make the business case for the establishment and implementation of 
OLGMs, while the challenges are source of learning to enable developing solutions to improve 
effectiveness of OLGMs.   
 
 
 
                                                 
46 Sarah and Jenkin (n 26) 802-803. 
47 Sarah and Jenkin (n 26) 802-803.  
48 Sarah and Jenkin (n 26) 810. 
49 Kaufman Jonathan and Katherine McDonnell, ‘Community-driven operational grievance mechanisms" (2016) 
Business and Human Rights Journal 127, 127-128. 
50 The RAID Report, ‘Human Rights Violations Under Private Control: Acacia Mining’s Grievance Mechanism  
and the Denial of Rights’ (2019) 7-11, <http://www.raid-
uk.org/sites/default/files/raid_report_on_private_grievance_mechanisms_final_12_june_2019.pdf> accessed 20 
July 2019 
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V. Effectiveness Criteria for OLGMs 
John Ruggie (2008), advanced six (6) essential criteria for effective non-judicial grievance 
mechanisms (including OLGMs), which are: legitimacy, accessibility, equitability, predictability, 
transparency, rights-compatibility .51 In addition to the six overarching principles, Principle 31 of the 
UNGP added that OLGMs should also be a source of continuous learning, and based on engagement 
and dialogue. In total, making up eight criteria. However, it is viewed that the eight criteria are not 
conclusive. Emerging best practices may be used to supplement them. D. Kemp and N. Gotzmann 
(2009) supports that there are a set of supplementary best practices principles such as culturally 
appropriate, proportionality, empowering, and continual improvement, that are prominent in guidelines 
relating to OLGMs.52   
 
Newton Alex (2019), confirmed that the effective criteria provide a standard for inter alia designing a 
non-judicial grievance mechanism to help ensure that it is effective in practice.53 That the criteria are 
intended to be interdependent and should be implemented as a whole.54 However, the author’s work 
never provided the steps companies should take to meet the different standards in the context of 
OLGMs. But, Caroline Rees (2008), argued that the criteria could be fulfilled by integrating them in the 
steps and processes involved in the establishment and implementation of the OLGMs.55 
 
In sum, the eight criteria are not conclusive but minimum standards to guide the establishment and 
implementation of OLGMs. Best practices may supplement them. Compliances with the standards 
require incorporating the standards in the processes involved in the creation and administration of 
OLGMs.56 Incorporating the standards require articulation of action-guidance that companies should 
perform to meet the standards.57 
                                                 
51 Ruggie John, ‘Protect, respect and remedy: A framework for business and human rights’ (2008) Innovations: 
Technology, Governance, Globalization 189, 206. 
52 Kemp D., and N. Gotzmann, ‘Community complaints and grievance mechanisms and the Australian minerals 
industry’ (2009) vii. 
53 Newton (n 25) 118. 
54 Newton (n 25) 118. 
55 Caroline (n 44) 1. 
56 Caroline (n 44) 1. 
57 CSR Europe, ‘Assessing the effectiveness of company grievance mechanisms; CSR Europe’s Management of 
Complaints Assessment (MOC-A) Results’ (2013) 10, 
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VI. Justifications for implementing OLGMs 
Caroline Rees (2011),58 supported that OLGMs plays a critical role in meeting the corporate 
responsibility to respect human rights in two main ways. Firstly, the mechanisms support the 
identification of adverse human rights impacts as a part of a company’s ongoing human rights due 
diligence by providing a channel for raising concerns to victims when they believe they are being or 
will be harmed. Secondly, the mechanisms make it possible for grievances, once identified, to be 
addressed early and directly by the company, thereby preventing harms and grievances from 
compounding and escalating, respectively.  
 
Newton Alex (2019),59 also explained that implementing the mechanisms is not only beneficial to the 
victims in terms of easy access at reduced costs compared to litigation, it is also significant to the 
company in that through the mechanisms, companies are not only enabled to resolve grievances 
early and directly, but also facilitated to obtain essential information on trends and patterns in 
complaints which can enable them to respond and adapt their business practices accordingly.  
 
However, the works of Newton Alex and Caroline Rees did not evaluate the arguments against 
OLGMs that may push a company to resist the establishment and implementation of OLGMs. 
Nonetheless, Emma Wilson and Blackmore Emma (2013) provided that the mechanism is associated 
with a number of perceived disadvantages: 60 It is resource-intensive, and it might encourage the filing 
of vexatious claims and putting pressure on the company to make unreasonable concessions or 
payments. 
 
Overall, the assessment of the literature demonstrates that establishing and implementing OLGMs 
could be beneficial to the company and intended users, hence the justification for their development. 
                                                                                                                                                        
<https://www.csreurope.org/sites/default/files/uploads/Assessing%20the%20effectiveness%20of%20Company%
20Grievance%20Mechanisms%20-%20CSR%20Europe%20%282013%29_0.pdf> accessed on 29 August 2019. 
58 Rees Caroline, ‘Piloting principles for effective company-stakeholder grievance mechanisms: A report of 
lessons learned. Corporate Social Responsibility Initiative’ (Harvard Kennedy School 2011) 8-9. 
59 Newton (n 25) 116. 
60 Wilson Emma and Emma Blackmore, ‘Dispute or Dialogue: Community perspectives on company-led 
grievance mechanisms" (International Institute for Environment and Development (IIED): London 2013) 13. 
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However, the company may be held back by the perceived disadvantages, unless a persuasive 
business case that offsets the perceived disadvantages, is presented. 
 
2.2. Conclusion 
This study reviewed the literature relevant to establishing and implementing OLGMs, around five main 
areas: understanding of OLGMs; grievance resolution models of the mechanisms; designing and 
implementing the mechanisms; experiences with regards to the mechanisms; the effectiveness 
criteria for the mechanisms; and the justification for the mechanisms. What arose from the review is 
that companies can play a significant role in enabling and strengthening access to remedies through 
OLGMs. Whereas the literature concur on the need for companies to develop and administer OLGMs, 
they presented the information on establishing and implementing OLGMs in a general perspective, 
albeit acknowledging that the process is a tailored one that must be done in the context of a specific 
country, business, culture and intended stakeholders.61 This manifests a knowledge gap in creating 
and operating OLGMs in the context of specific countries and local environment. In light of the gap, 
this study focuses on establishing and implementing OLGMs to remediate human rights abuses 
involving oil and gas companies in the context of South Sudan in view of the UNGP, Petroleum Act, 
and other best practice principles. Further research could also be done in the context of specific 
businesses in other countries in view of the UNGP and relevant domestic legislation. The study would 
vitally contribute to guaranteeing access to remedies via OLGMs.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
61 Caroline (n 44) 2. 
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CHAPTER THREE: THE RIGHT TO EFFECTIVE REMEDIES AND OLGMS 
3.0. Introduction 
This Chapter examines the indirect obligation of corporations to provide effectives remedies under 
international law, the corporate responsibility to respect and provide a remedy under the UNGP, the 
standards under the UNGP and Petroleum Act, for effective OLGMs. The chapter further explains the 
procedural and substantive aspects of the right to remedies, and the relationship between remedies 
and underlying rights. 
 
3.1. The indirect obligation of corporations under international law  
International Law recognises the right to an effective remedy for victims of violations of international 
human rights law, under numerous international instruments.62 In particular, article 8 of the UDHR, 
article 2(3) of the ICCPR, article 6 of the ICERD, article 14 of the CAT, and article 39 of the CRC. The 
right is also affirmed under soft-law instruments such as the Basic Principles and Guidelines on the 
Right to a Remedy (2005),63 and the UNGP.64 Consequently, there is no contention over the fact that 
victims of human rights violations and abuses have a right to an effective remedy and reparation.65 
 
Generally, the obligation under international law to provide effective remedies applies directly to the 
State parties. It is part of the State’s obligation to protect human rights.66 The protect obligation stems 
from the interpretation of human rights obligations under human rights treaties.67 The UN Human 
Rights treaty bodies adopted specific tripartite typology of how human rights obligations should be 
secured. According to the typology, States have obligations to ‘respect’, ‘protect’ and  ‘fulfil’ human 
rights.68 In the context of business activities, the obligation to protect is the most relevant.69 The 
protect obligation means that States parties must prevent infringements of human rights by third party, 
                                                 
62 Sonja B. Starr, ‘The right to an effective remedy: Balancing Realism and Aspiration,’ in Ssenyonjo 
Manisuli, International human rights law: six decades after the UDHR and beyond (Routledge 2016) 478. 
63 Principles 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 18 – 23. 
64 Principles 11, 13, 15, 22 and 25. 
65 Livio Zilli, ‘The Right to a Remedy and to Reparation for Gross Human Rights Violations: A Practitioners Guide 
No.2’ (International Commission of Jurists Geneva 2018) 15. 
66 John (n 51) 191. 
67 Frederic Megret, ‘Nature of Obligations’, in  Moeckli Daniel, et al., (eds), International human rights law (Oxford 
University Press 2018) 97. 
68 Ibid. 
69 CESCR GC 24, para.10. 
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including companies within their territory and/or jurisdiction.70 However, the obligation is a standard of 
conduct. States are not per se responsible for human rights abuse by private actors, but they may 
breach their obligations where such abuse can be attributed to them, or where they fail to act with due 
diligence to prevent, investigate, punish and redress private actors’ abuse.71  
 
Because the State has the power to decide the appropriate steps to take to protect human rights, it 
can consider a wide range of acceptable preventative and remedial measures, including legislation.72 
The Human Rights Committee (HRC), the Committee on the ESCR, and the Committee on the Rights 
of the Child, for instance, explained that States should, on the one hand, provide adequate remedies 
to redress adverse business-related human rights impacts, and on the other hand, adopt a legal 
framework requiring business entities to inter alia, account for their negative business-related 
impacts.73 This recommendation is construed to mean that under international law, effective remedies 
can be directly provided by the State, or/and the State can, through national law, require corporations 
to provide effective remedies as a mean to ensure corporate accountability.  
 
The direct provision of remedies by the State involves establishing effective State-based processes of 
claiming reparations by victims of rights violations against corporate perpetrators.74 The State-based 
mechanisms may be judicial or non-judicial administered.75 Judicial processes can include claims in 
civil or criminal proceedings against the corporation alleged to have committed or contributed to the 
human rights abuse.76 Non-judicial State-based grievance mechanisms vary from State to State but 
may include, labour tribunals, national human rights institutions, ombudsperson offices, and other 
Government-run complaints offices.77 The reparations which can be provided by the State-based 
mechanisms may include apologies, restitution, rehabilitation, financial or non-financial compensation, 
criminal or administrative sanctions, and prevention orders such as injunctions or guarantees of non-
                                                 
70 Megret (n 67) 97. 
71 Commentary to Principle 1. 
72 Commentary to Principle 1. 
73 HRC GC 31, CESCR GC 24 and CRC GC 16. 
74 Principle 25. 
75 Commentary to Principle 25. 
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repetition.78 Generally, the reparations is to counteract or make good any human rights harms that 
have occurred.79 
 
On the other hand, adopting the legal framework to hold corporations accountable for human rights 
abuses, would require implementing domestic laws to impose legal obligation on corporations to, 
among others, provide remedies to those affected by their activities as the mean to facilitate 
accountability.80 However, adopting national legislation to obligate corporations to provide remedies 
may be affected by the unwillingness or inability of the State. Many States may be unwilling or unable 
to adopt legislation or enforce existing legislation that provides protection to victims of corporate 
human rights violation, for the reason of ‘attracting investments or because of investment agreements 
that significantly freeze the State’s regulatory powers.’81 But, where the State through her national law 
imposes an obligation on corporations to set up remedial mechanisms to redress corporate human 
rights abuses, this can be considered as an international law compatible-way through which the State 
has positively given effect to its protect obligation.82  
 
In the context of South Sudan, for instance, through her Transitional Constitution 2011 (as amended), 
under article 172(2)(n), it is required that petroleum and gas development and management must be 
guided by the principle that ensures accountability for violations of human rights and degradation to 
the environment caused by petroleum and gas-related operations. As part of the means to achieve 
the accountability, section 94 of the Petroleum Act, requires petroleum corporations to establish a 
dispute resolution mechanism to address grievances against the corporations. Adopting such 
legislation can be argued to be a fulfilment of the country’s obligation to protect human rights under 
the International Human Rights treaties, to which it is a State party, such as the CAT, CRC, ICCPR 
and ICESCR. The corporations’ direct obligation under the national law is considered the indirect 
obligation under international law. 
 
                                                 
78 ibid. 
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82 Andrew Clapham, ‘Non-State actors,’ in Moeckli Daniel, et al., (eds), International human rights law. (Oxford 
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3.2. The Corporate responsibility to respect, and provide a remedy under the UNGP 
The corporate responsibility to respect human rights calls on corporations to address adverse human 
rights impacts caused through their activities or business relationships.83 While a company’s 
“activities” are understood to include both actions and omissions, its “business relationships” are 
understood to include relationships with business partners, entities in its value chain, and any other 
non-State or State entity directly linked to its business operations, products or services.84 As per 
principles 15(c) and 22, to fulfil  the respect responsibility, companies should have legitimate 
processes to enable the remediation for the reason that even with the best policies and practices, a 
company may cause or contribute to an adverse human rights impact that it has not foreseen or been 
able to prevent. When such adverse impacts are identified, the company should actively engage in 
the remediation.85 
 
One of the legitimate processes to enable remediation, is ‘OLGMs’ as per the clarification 
commentary to principle 22 provided. Commentary to principle 29 clarifies three ways of administering 
the OLGMs: a) the company alone b) the company in collaboration with other stakeholders or c) by 
mutually acceptable external expert or body. Although the same standards can be used for their 
development, the OLGMs administered in the three ways ‘vary in terms of processes, form, location, 
and remedy outcomes.86 The relevant OLGMs for the purpose of this study is the OLGMs 
administered by a company alone. 
 
Commentary to Principle 29 cautioned against using the OLGM to oust access to other grievance 
mechanisms. This thoughtfulness implies OLGMs should be established and implemented ‘within the 
prospect of existing mechanisms to ensure the provision of alternative channels for issues that cannot 
or should not be addressed through the mechanism.’87  It is debatable whether the limitation can be 
                                                 
83 Principles 11, 13(a), 15(c) and 22 
84 Commentary on principle 13. 
85 Commentary on principle 22. 
86 Martijn (n 24) 190-191. 
87 SHIFT, “Remediation, Grievance Mechanisms, and the Corporate Responsibility to Respect Human Rights” 
(New York 2014) 4. 
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legally binding on the victim. However, it will demonstrate the company’s bad faith in terms of 
guaranteeing access to remedies.88 
The corporate responsibility to respect human rights does not depend on the willingness or ability of a 
State to protect human rights. It is an independent responsibility as per commentary to Principle 11. 
This clarification implies that it is no longer an excuse for corporations to fail to provide remedies on 
the basis of State’s inability or unwillingness to directly provide State-based grievance mechanisms or 
adopt domestic legislation requiring corporations to establish OLGMs for ensuring accountability for 
violations.  
 
Though the respect responsibility under the UNGP exists “autonomously, and above compliance with 
national laws,”89 it does not remove or lessen a corresponding corporate duty under national law to 
create a complaint resolution mechanism. Where there is a national law which is consistent with 
international norms such as the Petroleum Act, it is never inconsistent with any international norms, to 
create and implement OLGMs in compliance with both the national law and the UNGP. It is viewed 
that such creation could provide a more functional OLGMs because of the binding nature of national 
law and the influential nature of international norms which can mutually reinforce each other.  
 
3.3. The Standards under the UNGP and the Petroleum Act, for effective OLGMs 
The standards for effective OLGMs are expressed under the Petroleum Act and the UNGP. Section 
94(1) of the Act requires the mechanism to comply with the highest international standards, and be: 
(a) proportional to the complexity of the issue; (b) culturally appropriate; (c) understandable, 
transparent, accountable; (d) address concerns promptly; and (e) at no cost to the successful party 
and without reprisal. However, the Act never provided explanation of the standards. But, by virtue of 
requiring compliance with the ‘highest international standards’, it is argued that the Petroleum Act’s 
standards be construed in accordance with those of the international norm, the UNGP. 
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Principle 31 of the UNGP outlined and explained the standards as follows:  
Legitimacy, signifies that the mechanism must ensure  trust from the benefiting stakeholders 
and being accountable for the fair conduct of its processes; Accessibility, requires that the 
mechanism must be made known to the stakeholders for whose use they are intended, and 
providing adequate assistance for those who may face particular barriers to access; 
Equitability, indicates that it must ensure that aggrieved parties have reasonable access to 
sources of information, advice, and expertise necessary to engage in a grievance process on 
fair and equitable terms; Predictable, infers that the process need to be simplified, clear and 
known publicly, including the time duration at each step of the process and the nature of 
outcome available; Transparency, implies that the parties require to continuously updated 
about the grievance process and performance to build confidence in the mechanism; Rights-
compatibility, indicates that the mechanism must ensures that the process, outcomes and 
remedies resonate with internationally recognized human rights norms; Source of continuous 
learning, means that frequent assessment of the mechanism should be used to steer 
improvement in the mechanism to prevent future grievances and harms; and Engagement and 
dialogue-based approach signifies that the design, implementation and performance 
assessment of the mechanism should be based on consultation with affected stakeholders.  
The UNGP’s standards are more expansive than the Petroleum Act’s standards. However, the 
Petroleum Act’s standards are observed as consistent with those of the UNGP. In addition to its 
standards, the Petroleum statute recognizes compliance with the highest international standards. The 
UNGP being an international norm arguably form part of the highest standards envisaged under the 
Petroleum Act.   
 
Additionally, it is argued that the Petroleum Act and UNGP’s standards are not conclusive. Emerging 
best practices may be used to supplement them. D. Kemp and N. Gotzmann (2009) explained, there 
are supplementary best practices principles such as proportionality, empowering and continual 
improvement that are prominent in guidelines relating to OLGMs.90 
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26 
 
Hence, the requirements set by the Petroleum statute, the UNGP, and other best practice principles 
are the standards for establishing and implementing effective OLGMs to remediate human rights 
abuses involving oil and gas companies in the context to South Sudan. 
 
3.4. The procedural and substantive components of effective remedies 
Effective remedies are composed of the procedural and substantive components. The procedural 
aspect concerns the right to raise human rights concerns before a mechanism.91 The procedural 
element consists of the State-based and non-State-based grievance mechanisms. The State-based 
grievance mechanisms are the ones administered by the State.92 They may be judicial or non-judicial 
processes.93 The Non-State-based grievance mechanisms include OLGMs administered by the 
business either alone or with other stakeholders, or by mutually acceptable external expert or body.94 
 
The substantive component on the other hand, concerns the actual relief to which the victims of 
human rights abuses are entitled.95 They are sometimes referred to as ‘reparations.’96 The reparations 
provided by the judicial mechanisms  are also relevant in the context of OLGMs, with the exception of 
criminal sanctions, which are reserve of the State.97 However, there is no hierarchy in which the 
reparations may be provided.98 For example, the company may start with making an apology, and 
where possible, undoing the misconduct and restoring the situation to its original position, by 
remediation in kind or financial.99  
 
The procedural component provides the channel through which the substantive relief (reparations) are 
provided to the victims of human rights abuses, and the provision of both OLGMs and reparations are 
guided by the principle of proportionality.100 OLGMs must be proportional to the severity of adverse 
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human rights impacts.101 Equally, the form of reparations awarded needs to be proportional to the 
gravity of the abuse.102 However, how to speciﬁcally assess proportional remedies is unclear.103 
Whereas the company may offer remedies based on its planned resources, the victim may expect 
remedies according to his/her satisfaction.104 The different perspectives on determining remedies 
raise challenging question of what specifically amounts to proportionate remedies?  
 
3.5. Relationship between remedies and underlying rights 
The right to effective remedies is an essential component of all internationally recognised human 
rights.105 It is recognized that business entities can have an impact on virtually the entire spectrum of 
internationally recognized human rights.106 Where there is a violation of any human rights, there 
should be remediation.107 It follows that abuse of any of the human rights generates the right to a 
remedy. 
 
Without affording the right to adequate remedies to redress a corporation’s violation of any human 
rights, there shall be no meaningful respect for human rights.108 For instance, the Committee on the 
Rights of the Child observed that “for rights to have meaning, effective remedies must be available to 
redress violations”, and that “where rights are found to have been breached, there should be 
appropriate reparation.”109 
 
3.6. Conclusion 
The Chapter reviewed the right to effective remedies and OLGMs. It revealed that the requirement 
and standards to create and implement OLGMs exist  both under the Petroleum Act and UNGP. With 
or without the existence of the national law, the normative basis could still exist under the UNGP. 
However, in the presence of the Petroleum Act, it is not inconsistent with any international standards, 
to establish and implement OLGMs in compliance with the Act, UNGP, and other best practice 
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principles. The OLGM is a procedural aspect of effective remedies through reparations are obtained. 
Every human rights violation should attract reparation(s) proportional to the gravity of the abuse and 
harm, to ensure meaningful respect for human rights.  
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Chapter IV: Establishing and implementing an effective OLGM 
4.0. Introduction 
This chapter examines how the oil and gas corporations can establish and implement an effective 
OLGM in compliance with the standards under principle 31 of the UNGP, section 94 of the Petroleum 
Act, and other best practice principles.  
 
A variety of studies present different ways of establishing and implementing OLGMs. From the work 
of Stefan Zagelmeyer, Bianchi Lara, and Shemberg A. R. (2018),110 and the leading guidelines of the 
CAO (2008),111 and the IPIECA (2012) and (2015),112 this study establishes that the companies can 
achieve the creation and implementation through five (5) essential phases. The phases are: the initial 
step of considering key issues; designing the mechanism; developing the procedural steps of 
managing grievances; testing, review and disseminating the mechanism; and finally, the phase of 
implementing, monitoring and learning. Each of the phases, in turn, involves different steps or 
processes.  
 
It is reasoned that the five phases are realisable to the companies of all sizes and are capable to 
adequately produce effective OLGMs compatible to the business, local context and legal 
requirements. 
 
4.1. Phase I: The initial step of considering key issues 
The UNGP and the Petroleum Act provide the normative basis and standards for OLGMs, but the 
frameworks are incapable of setting themselves into operation. As such, it is explained that the idea to 
establish and implement the OLGM starts from ‘somewhere and with someone in the company’.113 
For the idea to gain greater support and result into creating appropriate mechanism, two key issues 
should be considered: (I) the business human rights risks and local context; and (II) the business case 
for the mechanism.114 Considering these issues is significant to ensure having a customized 
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mechanism fit for the business and local circumstances, and to facilitate greater acceptance and 
support of the mechanism within the company.115   
 
I. The business human rights risk and the local context.  
Understanding the business human rights risk and local circumstances are significant to influence the 
creation and implementation of an OLGM which is proportionate to the human rights harms linked to 
the business operation in the national context.116 To gain insight of the potential human rights issues 
and the local context, the corporations need to conduct ‘human rights due diligence’ in accordance 
with the UNGP.117 Human rights due diligence is one of the means to fulfil the corporate responsibility 
to respect human rights.118 It helps to identify who may be affected and the nature of adverse human 
rights impacts.119 It also enables the companies to gain an understanding of the existing State-based 
grievance mechanisms as well as the traditional justice system.120 Human Rights due diligence is 
achieved through conducting Human Rights Impact Assessment (HRIA).121  
 
Essentially, the people who may be affected by petroleum activities could be within and outside the 
area of operations. The potential specific human rights issues the HRIA may reveal include, abuses 
perpetrated through environmental destruction, security guards, employment conditions, undermining 
the livelihoods of surrounding communities through impacts on their health, land, water and other 
natural resources, or failing to adequately consult indigenous groups to secure their consent prior to 
operations.122  The abuses through these means, translate into the violation of the internationally 
recognised human rights that companies should respect as clarified under principle 12 of the UNGP.  
 
Regarding traditional justice system, the HRIA will potentially reveal that the local community’s 
common way of resolving grievances in the oil producing regions of South Sudan, is through their 
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‘traditional authorities’.123 They apply customary laws to reach culturally appropriate remedies.124 A 
violation of the right to life, for instance, is remedied by ‘customary blood compensation’ inform of 
cows.125 The traditional dispute resolution mechanism and the customary blood compensation are 
recognised by unwritten customs and statutory law. The Local Government Act 2009 (Laws of 
Southern Sudan), bestows customary powers on the local chiefs to adjudicate on customary disputes 
such as land disputes, women rights and child rights.126 The Penal Code Act 2008 (Laws of Southern 
Sudan), on the other hand, recognises customary blood compensation as a substitute for a death 
sentence for causing death of a person.127The traditional systems of justice and remediation are 
considered legitimate, respected, and valued by the communities and law enforcement agencies. The 
understanding of these will lead to designing and implementing a culturally appropriate OLGM in line 
with Section 94(1) of the Petroleum Act, and best practice principle.  
 
OLGM is meant to ‘complement and supplement State-based grievance mechanisms,’128 therefore 
the understanding of the existing State-based grievance mechanisms at the initial step is vital to 
inform the establishment and implementation of the mechanism within the prospect of the State-
based mechanisms. In the context of South Sudan, the existing State-based mechanisms include 
judicial and non-judicial mechanisms. The judiciary is established under part seven of the Transitional 
Constitution 2011 (as amended). On the other hand, the non-judicial mechanisms include the South 
Sudan Human Rights Commission established under article 6 of the Southern Sudan Human Rights 
Commission Act 2009 to investigate human rights abuses, and the Commission for Conciliation, 
Mediation and Arbitration established under section 22 of the Labour Act 2017 (Laws of South 
Sudan), to resolve labour-related disputes. Hence, these State-based mechanisms may provide 
alternative channels for issues that cannot or should not be addressed through the OLGM.  
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In sum, taking into consideration the business and local contexts will lead to developing a mechanism 
which is business-compatible, culturally appropriate, and complementary to the State-based 
grievance channels.  
 
II. The business case for the mechanism 
Primarily, from the perspective of corporations, developing and administering OLGMs could be 
perceived as burdensome.129 It may require investing huge resources in terms of time, money and 
operating personnel.130 A formalized mechanism is also feared to put pressure on the company to 
handle vexatious claim or make unreasonable payments.131 With such perceived disadvantages, the 
top management of the corporation may be sceptical to investing in the mechanism or supporting it, 
unless justification for its creation is clearly advanced to outweigh the perceived disadvantages.132 
Consequently, to gain ‘internal buy-in and influence broader support, ownership and collaboration for 
the mechanism from the high level of the corporation,’ business case for the mechanism need to be 
made to convince the top leadership to erase the scepticism about the use of OLGMs.133 the IPIECA 
(2015), opines that persuasive business case should point out the benefits of the mechanism, explain 
how the mechanism can prevent or reduce conflict and should propose appropriate mechanism’s 
name.134 
 
Principle 29 of the UNGP advances the opportunities of using OLGMs and the way it can prevent or 
reduce conflict. It describes the mechanism as a channel that enables both actual and perceived 
grievances to be addressed early and remediated directly by the company, thereby preventing 
them from escalating.135 To the company, this would translate into minimizing risk to shareholder 
value, building good corporate reputation, reducing the threat of judicial actions, and strategic for 
complying with national law and international standards.136 To the stakeholders, it would mean that 
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through the OLGMs, their grievances will potentially be handled directly by the company, 
expeditiously, and inexpensively compared to judicial mechanisms.137 These benefits would arguably 
incentivise support for the development of the OLGM.  
 
The other component of the business case is naming the OLGM.  It is  explained that there is no right 
or wrong way to name a grievance mechanism, but it is risky to call a grievance mechanism by a 
name that diminishes or glosses over its real purpose.138 An inappropriate name may leave those with 
grievances feel belittled and disrespected.139 Mechanism’s appropriate name is judged by its link with 
the issues it is to remediate, ability to create a conviction to the stakeholders that the mechanism is 
developed to address their concerns, and the ability to position the mechanism, for instance, as a key 
element of overall corporate human rights commitment and compliance.140 It is stated that the 
common appropriate names used are ‘community grievance mechanism’, ‘complaint mechanism’ or 
‘complaint procedure’.141 Such a name could be significant in gaining internal buy-in and pleasant to 
the intended users.142 Choice of appropriate name is not a legal requirement but best practice. 
 
In sum, persuasive business case that contains the benefits of the mechanism, explanation of how 
the mechanism can prevent or reduce conflict and proposes appropriate name for the mechanism, will 
potentially inspire the key decision makers of the company to overlook the perceived demerits allied 
with the mechanism, but rather supports its development and implementation.  
 
4.2. Phase II: Designing the Mechanism 
The phase of designing the mechanism consists of (I) forming the design team and engaging 
stakeholders, and (II) defining the scope of the mechanism.  
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I. Form design team and engage stakeholders 
Upon getting persuaded to support the development and implementation of the OLGMS, it is a good 
practice that the key decision makers of the company form a design team, which will serve as ‘the 
strategy team, designer, and promoter of the mechanism’.143 The composition of the team depends on 
what is appropriate to the company, but the team has to be diverse and cross-functional to ensure 
that different perspectives are considered in the design process.144 The team may consist of 
individuals from the company departments such as operations, community relations, human 
resources, environmental affairs, legal and human rights affairs.145 Although the design team should 
be of mixed levels and company departments, the team should, however, be manageable in size to 
ensure timely decision making and progress in designing the mechanism.146 The CAO (2008), advises 
the size of the team to be from eight (8) to twelve (12) with clear terms of reference and a work plan 
that explains the team goals, roles, level of decision-making authority, reporting lines, tasks, and time 
frame.147 However, a smaller company may have a lower number, what is vital is having clear goals to 
achieve  within agreed time frame. 
 
In compliance with Principle 31(h), the design team should engage and involve stakeholders in the 
establishment process of the mechanism. The team engages with both internal and external 
stakeholders. Internal stakeholders may include personnel from different company departments, 
leaders of any existing complaint handling mechanisms, business managers, business partners and 
contractors.148 External stakeholders may include community groups, civil society, trade unions, 
cultural leaders, representatives of indigenous groups, vulnerable groups or minority groups.149 
Whereas engagement with internal stakeholders may be simpler, through meetings or circulating 
information electronically and getting feedback at the comfort of offices, the engagement with external 
stakeholders may require extra-attention, because as Cathal Doyle (2015) stated, where it is done 
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inappropriately, it will limit the likelihood of the intended users’ participation in the development or use 
of the mechanism, hence affecting the effectiveness of the mechanism.150 
 
The engagement with external stakeholders should be meaningful and inclusive.151 Meaningful 
consultation entails considering the concerns and priorities of the stakeholders to enable reaching a 
mutual perspective about the design and administration of the mechanism.152 For instance, the 
stakeholders may want to participate at different levels, ranging from providing advice to co-designing 
the process and from undertaking some aspects of implementing the mechanism, to needing some 
remedy outcomes from their perspectives.153 The design team should be flexible to consider the 
concerns to create trust in the process. 
 
An inclusive engagement involves consulting the communities widely.154 A community is made up of a 
range of stakeholder interests. The stakeholders who may be potential users of the mechanisms 
should be identified, engaged, and their particular interests given consideration.155 However, inclusive 
engagement does not mean that everyone in the community can or should be involved, but that 
efforts must be made to be as inclusive as possible and to offer everyone a chance to be engaged in 
a matter that affects his/her interest.156 
 
A number of potential barriers may affect carrying out an inclusive engagement. The barriers may 
include, rural isolation of certain groups, a divided community, the capacity and ability of different 
groups to participate, hard-to-reach areas, literacy level and levels of community infrastructure.157 
There should be a plan in advance to overcome the barriers. They could be overcome by employing 
different engagement methods such as organising serial meeting events, collaborating with 
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independent entities to facilitate the engagement or transportation to local areas which are hard-to-
reach, formulating communications into local languages, or using local interpreters.158 
 
Furthermore, challenges may also arise during the engagement. For instance, the stakeholders may 
attempt to change the context of discussion to matters beyond the designing and implementing the 
mechanism.159 To mitigate the challenge, the IPIECA (2015) advises that the design team need to 
provide a clear framework for discussion which should revolve around the objectives and scope of the 
mechanism.160 In addition, the team should explain to the stakeholders, the limitations they face, such 
as time constraints, finances and resources available.161 These will potentially keep the engagement 
focused on issues which are up for discussion. Expectations of stakeholders should be managed 
within the issues under discussion, although must be done with a certain level of flexibility capable to 
retain meaningful engagement to create trust in the process.162 Results of engagements should be 
documented. They are vital in defining the scope of the mechanism that will be appropriate for the 
business and the stakeholders.163 
 
Conducting meaning and inclusive engagement with the stakeholder groups to consider their 
concerns and priorities, reflects the fulfilment of the standard of engagement and dialogue under 
principle 31 (h). It is also a foundation to build trust and legitimacy around the mechanism.164  
 
II. Defining the scope of the mechanism 
The process of defining the scope of the mechanism is undertaken based on the results from the 
engagement process, and the assessment of the business human risk and local context done at the 
initial phase.165 Defining the scope of the mechanism requires: a) determining the types of grievances 
that will be within or outside the jurisdiction of the mechanism; b) the geographical area from within 
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which grievances can be accepted; c) who is eligible to bring complaint; and d) scaling the 
mechanism to the business human rights risks.166 
 
a) Types of grievances within and outside the scope 
Principle 22 of the UNGP is to the effect that remediation through the OLGM should be for adverse 
impacts the business caused or contributed to. This implies that the types of grievances within the 
scope of the mechanism should be the actual adverse human rights impacts. The OHRHC 
interpretive guide defines “actual human rights impact” to mean an adverse impact that has already 
occurred or is occurring.167 This is a restricted interpretation that leave out a range of concerns likely 
to intensify into severe impacts at a later stage. The CAO (2008) advises that the grievances may 
also include those arising from perceptions because perceived concerns can be as critical to 
addressing as actual adverse impacts. They often arise when people are misinformed or do not have 
adequate information.168 Additionally, impacts that may not raise human rights issues immediately 
should be included because they could intensify overtime into severe impacts.169 For instance, 
communities that find their grievances about noise or dust continually ignored would feel compelled to 
engage in a protest to get the company to pay attention.170 Such situations could lead to incidents of 
violence and harm to health or life.171 OLGM should, therefore, be able to pick up a full range of 
concerns early enough to prevent their escalation and address underlying issues.172  
 
Grievances that may fall outside the scope of the mechanism are those that allege criminal offences 
because OLGM does not provide ‘criminal sanctions’, which is a reserve of the State.173 Generally, 
they should be referred to be handled through the State’s criminal justice system. However, in other 
circumstances, criminal offences may constitute human rights abuses. Such could be classified as 
falling within the scope of the mechanism.174 For instance, where government security personnel or 
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police, are employed to provide security to the company facilities and in the course of their duties, 
they commit abuses amounting to human rights abuses, the matters could still be addressed by the 
company mechanism. The RAID report (2019), illustrated such a scenario with the Acacia Mining 
grievance mechanism in Tanzania, clarifying that it had the scope to handle as human rights abuses, 
security-related abuses such as murder, assault and violence committed by the security agents or 
Tanzanian police who worked alongside the company.175 However, handling the matters as human 
rights abuses via the mechanisms will not prevent criminal prosecution in the State criminal justice 
system. 
 
b) Geographical scope 
Limitation on admissible complaints in terms of geographies should be minimized. This is because 
petroleum activities have the ability to ‘affect individuals or communities that are physically or/and 
geographically distant from operating area.’176  The BP’s Deepwater Horizon oil spill of 2010 that 
commenced from Macondo operating area of Mexico, provides a good example. It was reported that 
in a day for 87 days, estimated 40,000 to 60,000 barrels leaked into the Gulf of Mexico.177 The oil spill 
damaged the environment, marine life and the Gulf, affecting thousands of the Gulf residents whose 
livelihood depended on tourism or harvesting marine life.178 This clearly illustrates that petroleum 
activities can affect areas beyond operating location. Thus, geographical scope for the purpose of 
accepting complaints should be extensive, so long as complainants can support their claim. 
 
c) Locus standi 
Section 94(1) of the Petroleum Act, Principle 29 and the Complementary to Principle 22, envisage 
that the right to bring complaint before the mechanism is for individuals and communities who may be 
adversely impacted by the company’s activities. The OHCHR interpretive guide signals that the 
primary right is to the ‘directly’ affected stakeholders.179This may be construed to mean that where the 
directly affected individuals or groups cannot exercise the ‘primary right’ for one reason or the other, 
                                                 
175 The RAID Report (n 50). 
176 Cherry Miriam and Judd Sneirson, ‘Beyond profit: Rethinking corporate social responsibility and 
greenwashing after the BP oil disaster," (2010) 85 Tul. l. rev. 983,  991-994. 
177 Ibid. 
178 Ibid. 
179 OHRHC (n 45) 69. 
39 
 
their authorized representatives can have the standing (secondary right) to bring the complaint on 
their behalf. However, other third parties not directly impacted or authorized to represent may not be 
given the standing to lodge complaint before the mechanism.180 This limitation can be justified by 
resources availability that the company plans to invest in operating the mechanism because handling 
complaints is resource intensive.181 Caroline Rees (2008), argued that fact-finding investigation takes 
considerable money and time, yet a company may have other primary functions on which it wishes to 
focus its resources, and to which the grievance mechanism is an adjunct.182 Therefore it may not be in 
line with resources plan of the company to permit locus standi to any busybody. 
 
d) Scaling the mechanism  
Section 94(1)(a) of the Petroleum Act and best practice principle require establishing a mechanism 
which is proportional to other factors and the complexity of the issue or adverse impacts. The factors 
and complex issue referred here, are the above explained constituents of the scope of the 
mechanism. Namely: the types of grievances that fall within the jurisdiction of the mechanism,  the 
geographical coverage of the mechanism, and the eligible persons. Collectively, these factors should 
inform the establishment of a commensurate mechanism. 
 
In sum, clearly defining the scope of the mechanism and imposing fewer restrictions on admissibility 
issues in terms of geographical location, and the locus standi, shall facilitate development of 
mechanism which shall be appropriate to remediate issues of intended users and also eliminates 
barriers to accessing the mechanism. Consequently, the actions will demonstrate compliance with the 
best practice principle and the Petroleum Act’s requirement of developing a proportionate 
mechanism,183 and also a fulfilment of the UNGP’s standard of facilitating accessibility to affected 
stakeholders.184 
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4.3. Phase III: Developing the Procedural steps for Grievance Management 
Creating the procedural steps for grievance management is the next phase after the design phase. 
Save for indicating the standards that must be reflected in the steps, the UNGP and the Petroleum 
Act, are mute on the steps of managing grievance mechanism. Stefan Zagelmeyer, Bianchi Lara, and 
Shemberg A. R. (2018), pointed out that the steps vary from one company to another, with others 
mentioning four (4) or eight (8) steps.185 However, from the review of the leading guidance practices 
of IPIECA (2012),186 IPIECA (2015),187 CAO (2008), ICMM (2009),188 and IFC (2009),189 this study 
supports that, a typical OLGM is characterized by seven (7) basic steps for grievance management: I) 
receive and register the grievance; II) acknowledge receipt; III) assess and assign; IV) investigate; V) 
respond; VI) appeal or recourse to ADR and State-based mechanisms; and finally, VII) follow-up and 
close-out. It is supported that the 7 basic steps lead to a methodical resolution of grievances of all 
levels without creating procedural vacuum. 
 
I. Receiving and registering the grievance 
The receiving process is to facilitate the filing of grievances. To enable the reception of grievances, 
there need to be functional access points and methods of filing grievances.190 The access points 
could be a grievance section or designated company grievance officers, indigenous representatives, 
independent statutory bodies or/and local NGOs offices.191 The methods of filing grievances could be 
through dedicated email, letters, company complaint form, company website or toll-free telephone 
services.192 Whatever various access points and methods are provided, a study encourages that at 
least one of the them should be independent of the company for the reason that  an assumption must 
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be drawn that certain persons feel too frightened even at their own volition, to file a complaint directly 
with the company, so it is best that the company representatives are not made sole point of contact.193  
 
The access may be affected by possible barriers such as ‘lack of awareness, illiteracy, costs, physical 
location and fears of reprisals.’194 Therefore, actions should be taken to minimise the barriers as much 
as possible. Lack of awareness could be addressed by making the access points and methods known 
to the intended users through wider publicization via appropriate methods in the local context.195 
Depending on the local circumstances at the material time, some of the ways for wider dissemination 
of the access points and methods may include the use of posters and leaflets, public meetings, 
newsletter articles, and local radios.196 Illiteracy-associated concern may be addressed by simplifying 
the methods of accessing the mechanisms or availing local interpreters to provide assistance where 
necessary.197 The question of cost may be remedied by affording access free of charge. Physical 
location issue could be addressed by providing the access points in multiple locations where the 
intended users reside, and the fears of reprisals may be minimized by permitting anonymous filing 
or/and guaranteeing confidentiality of complaints in the mechanism’s governance framework.198 
 
Affording a variety of access points and methods of filing claims; making the access points and 
methods known through wider dissemination; permitting anonymous filing; guaranteeing 
confidentiality; and minimizing the barriers to accessing the mechanisms, shall be the fulfilment of 
accessibility standard of the UNGP,199 and achieving the Petroleum Act’s standard requiring that 
access to the mechanism be provided at no cost to the party and without reprisal.200 
  
Though it is applaudable for companies to provide a variety of methods of filing complaints, it is 
argued that permitting various methods may pose the challenge of receiving an ‘unidentical format of 
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complaint.’201 This will affect the company’s effort to maintain a common protocol of grievances for its 
record. It is encouraged that the company should formulate ‘grievance recording form to  collect 
grievances.’202 The form, however, needs to be simplified preferably in the language understandable 
to the users, and  assistance in completing should be made available for persons who may need 
assistance in filling.203 The complaint form could require essential information to facilitate easier follow 
up of the grievance. For instance, in the Chevron corporation’s grievance recording form formulated 
for use in the Chevron Myanmar Grievance Mechanism Procedure, the form requires basic 
information such as the date, time and location of filing; name and guarantee of confidentiality; 
preferred methods of contacting the complainant, physical address, nature of the complaint, 
reparations sought; and how the complainant proposes the grievance be solved.204 Such form could 
provide a good premise for formulating a simple company complaint form.  
 
In whichever channel and contact point the grievance is filed, the complaint needs to be forwarded to 
the central point of contact at the company. The complaints should be registered in a data system of 
complaints prepared by the company.205 The register of complaints should reflect the essential 
information contained in the grievance form, with additional information such as the name of the 
registering company officer and details of the accountable company officer the complaint is referred 
to.206 The registration is significant to keep track records of all complaints received and to establish 
clear lines of accountability.207 This ensures trust from the users of the mechanism, and accountability 
for the grievance processes, in line with the UNGP’s principle of legitimacy,208 and the Petroleum 
Act’s requirement of accountability.209  
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II. Acknowledge 
The process for acknowledging the receipt of a grievance needs to be in place.210 Acknowledgement 
confirms to the complainant that his/her complaint is received and registered.211 Depending on the 
manner in which the complaint has been lodged, acknowledgement may be made through signing on 
the copy of the grievance letter or acknowledgement slip. It could also be through a letter, email, 
telephone call or other appropriate ways.212 A study explains that acknowledgement may be made 
immediately upon receipt of the grievance or  typically within the standard of 2 to 7 days from the date 
of receipt of the complaint.213 However, circumstances such as anonymous complaint may delay 
timely acknowledgement, especially where the complainant could not easily be traced.214 
 
Acknowledgement needs to include information about the next steps to resolving the grievance, who 
to contact in the company for follow-up on the status of the complaint, the time frame in which a 
response can be expected, and a guarantee of confidentiality of the complaint.215 The detail 
information is significant to erase any mistaken assumption that the grievance is being ignored, to 
ensure transparency, and enable the complainant to foresee how the grievance will be handled.216 
This is consistent with the UNGP’s effectiveness principles of predictability and transparency,217as 
well as the transparency standard of the Petroleum Act.218 
 
III. Screen and assign 
Following acknowledgement of receipt of the complaint, the next step is to screen the complaint 
against the eligibility criteria of the OLGM.219 An eligible complaint will be one that has nexus to the 
business operation, falls within the scope of the mechanism, and the complainant has the standing to 
file the complaint.220 However, in the screening step, the grievance officer should avoid considering 
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the substantive merit of the complaint because it may lead to rejecting the complaint hastily without 
truly understanding the gist of the complaint.221  
 
Where the grievance clearly falls outside the mechanism’s remit, it may be rejected or referred to 
alternative grievance mechanisms, and the complainant informed of the reason accordingly.222 
However, before a complaint is rejected or referred to be handled elsewhere, a study clarifies that it is 
important that the complainant be directly engaged and afforded the benefit of doubt.223 This is 
because the complainant may have provided incomplete information due to his/her inability to have 
access to information or professional resources.224 The company needs to acknowledge this 
imbalance and make an effort to truly understand the grievance before rejecting or referring it 
elsewhere.225 Failure to recognize such barrier can reduce perceiving the mechanism as a fair 
grievance avenue and will boost resentment against the mechanism which may lead to protest and 
stiff opposition against the company by the users .226  
 
Upon assessing the grievance against the eligibility criteria, the step to follow, is assigning the 
grievance to  the appropriate company officer who shall handle it. Assigning company personnel to 
handle a particular grievance depends on the severity of the grievance.227 A company may use risk 
criteria created as part of the mechanism to categorize grievance according to level of severity, that 
is; less, moderate or  highly severe, to help determine what action is required and who will be 
appropriate to address the grievance.228 Where the grievance is classified as highly severe (grievance 
with high adverse impacts on individuals, community or/and company), senior management of the 
company may be advised to handle, but where the grievance is less severe or moderate, it may be 
handled by a designated company officer.229  
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The assigned grievance officer or senior manager of the company (as the case may be), in 
collaboration with the grievance committee or relevant business unit, will assess the complaint from 
the company’s perspective.230 Grievances that are observed as less serious, from the perspectives of 
the company and complainant, and do not require additional information may be resolved promptly 
without proceeding to the investigation stage.231 However, grievances that are complex and require 
additional information and in-depth scrutiny proceeds to the investigation step.232 
 
In the step of screening and assigning grievances, the UNGP’s principle of ‘rights-compatibility,’233 is 
complied with by assessing the grievance flexibly; engaging complainant directly on a grievance that 
could otherwise be outrightly rejected or referred elsewhere; and assigning the handling of the 
grievance according to the level of seriousness. The Petroleum Act’s standard requiring ‘addressing 
concerns promptly’ is achieved by resolving less or moderate grievances promptly without subjecting 
them to the investigation step.234 
 
IV. Investigate 
The investigation step is activated for grievances that are complex, require additional information, and 
in-depth scrutiny. In the absence of independent technical investigators, the business unit associated 
with the grievance should be required to appoint technical investigator(s) to examine within specified 
timeframe, the grievance that requires scrutiny.235 The purpose of the investigation is to understand 
the circumstances leading to the complaint, verify the facts of the grievance or obtain additional 
information from the view point of the company.236 
 
To ensure trust and fair conduct of investigation process in accordance with UNGP’s principles of 
legitimacy and rights-compatibility,237 the investigators have to be independent, neutral and free of 
personal interest in the matter under the investigation. To achieve this, the investigators should be 
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independent of those that will be authorizing reparations. It is also a good practice for the company to 
consider giving an opportunity to the complainant to accept or object to the assigned 
investigator(s).238 Neutral investigators will build confidence in the fact-finding process.239  
 
The investigation may include engaging directly with the complainant individually or together with 
his/her representative to understand the complainant’s insight into the issue and what can be done.240 
It may also involve engaging with relevant stakeholders within and outside the company or other 
parties involved.241 However, in the process of engaging with outside stakeholders or other parties, 
the investigation team should endeavour to maintain confidentiality of the complainant as much as 
possible.242 An exception to confidentiality would be when the prior consent of the complainant is 
obtained for the benefit of resolving the complaint. 
 
To meet the requirements of enabling access to information and keeping the complaint informed of 
the progress of the complaint, in line with the principles of equitability and transparency, the outcome 
of the investigation should be documented appropriately, submitted to the company, shared and 
discussed with the complainant.243 Sharing and discussing the outcome of the investigation will assist 
in reaching an agreement on the facts and solution with the complainant.244  
 
V. Respond and offer of remedies 
The process of responding and offering remedies follows the outcome of the investigation. The 
outcome of the investigation is internally discussed by the relevant company team.245 Based on the 
internal discussion, the authorized company officer formulates a respond that contains interim 
resolution options.246 The resolution proposals could be a rejection, offer of substantive remedies or 
referral of the grievance to be handled elsewhere.247 In line with the criteria of transparency,248 the 
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complaint should be informed of the resolution options, preferably in writing.249 The respond should be 
able to seek a dialogue directly with the complainant, to discuss the provisional proposal before the 
company makes a final pronouncement.250 Seeking dialogue reflects the criteria of prioritising 
dialogue as a mean to mutually resolve the grievance and creating trust and fairness, in accordance 
with the UNGP’s benchmarks of legitimacy and transparency.251  
 
The dialogue needs to be opened and transparent, affording the complainant the liberty to accept, 
appeal for the offer to be improved, reject or opt for another mechanism to resolve the grievance.252 
Keeping the dialogue opened and transparent is significant as illustrated by the commentary to 
principle 31, that the company cannot, with legitimacy, both be the subject of complaints and 
unilaterally determine their outcome. However transparent the dialogue may seem to be, a study 
explained that the perception of power imbalance by the weaker complainant (as it is often) might 
inevitably create distrust in the process.253 To ensure equality before the mechanism, the complainant 
should be allowed to be assisted in the dialogue by a representative of choice, who would protect 
his/her interest, or the dialogue meeting should be facilitated by a neutral third party acceptable to the 
parties to serve as the facilitator of the process.254 
 
Where the respond is an offer of substantive remedies, the remedies should be right compatible and 
commensurate to the nature of the grievance, in line with principle 31(f). It is rights compatible and 
commensurate when it is capable of correcting, alleviating or reversing the adverse human rights 
impact suffered by the victim(s).255 The remedies can be in the form of apologies, restitution, 
rehabilitation, financial or non-financial compensation, prevention of harm through, for example, 
injunctions or guarantees of non-repetition.256 However, as explained by Tineke Lambooy et al., 
(2013), there is no hierarchy of offering the reparations and could be offered separately or 
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combined.257 For example, the company may start with making an apology, and where possible, 
undoing the misconduct and restoring the situation to its original position, by remediation in kind or 
financial or both.258  
 
In addition, the reparations should be culturally appropriate to the complainant in that it should 
conform to the local customs of the victim(s).259 From the perspective of South Sudan, the rampant 
culturally appropriate remedy to remediate, for instance, violation of the right to life, is customary 
blood compensation inform of cows. The customary blood compensation is recognized under 
unwritten customary law and statutory law.260 Accommodating the customary perspective of 
reparations could present a fundamental concern to the company especially on the numbers of cows 
to be paid, but it is what could be appealing to the local communities to create satisfaction in the 
outcome. Therefore, consideration should be given to it, in providing reparations. 
 
Where the company confirms that the reparation is right-compatible, culturally appropriate, and 
acceptable to the complainant, in accordance with the requirements of the UNGP and the Petroleum 
statute, the company can ‘formulate the final agreement on the complaint,’261 and accordingly move 
the agreed reparation(s) to the company’s close-out process, unless the final resolution is ‘self-
executing’, such as a guarantee of non-repetition.262 
 
VI. Appeal or recourse to ADR and State-based mechanisms 
Where the final offer of reparations is rejected by the complainant or the company rejects the 
complaint, the company owes the duty to explain to the complainant, the available alternative or 
complementary channels for resolving grievances, such as making an appeal within the company or 
recourse to other dispute resolution mechanisms such as ADR mechanisms or State-based grievance 
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mechanisms.263 Creating an appellate system within the company to provide in-house review process 
is not mandatory but demonstrates good intent to resolve grievances amicably.264 
 
Where the in-house appeal process fails or it is non-existence, it is the standard of the UNGP that the 
right to recourse to other grievance mechanisms is afforded.265 The company is discouraged from 
using the OLGM to bar access to judicial or other non-judicial grievance mechanisms.266 The SHIFT 
study (2014) explained that the OLGM does not sit in a vacuum but instead within the landscape of 
State-based and other grievance mechanisms that may provide alternative or complementary 
channels, or be a potential point of recourse for issues that cannot or should not be addressed 
through the grievance mechanism.267  
 
Despites the requirement on companies to desist from using OLGM to preclude access to judicial or 
other non-judicial grievance mechanisms, studies reveal that some companies use the OLGM as the 
primary, sole and the final mean to obtain remedy. Cathal Doyle (2015) showed that Barrick Gold 
Corporation’s grievance mechanism at Porgera mine in Papua New Guinea is a concrete example. 
Victims who reached a settlement were required to sign an agreement stating that they would not 
pursue any civil legal actions or claims for compensation related to the acts for which the reparations 
were provided.268 Such a limitation negates the guaranteeing of access to remedies.269 In turn, it 
creates lack of trust towards the mechanism and undermines the UNGP’s principle of legitimacy.270 
 
Besides permitting access to State-based mechanisms, the other way companies can fulfil the 
UNGP’s rights-compatible criteria, is by incorporating ADR mechanisms as one of the approaches to 
handle grievances under the grievance mechanism.271 The ADR consists of mediation, negotiation 
and arbitration. Overall, it is a form of dispute resolution that involves active engagement of the 
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parties involved, outside the judicial mechanism.272 Incorporating ADR does not only ensure 
compliance with the UNGP’s rights-compatibility,273 and the Petroleum Act’s standard requiring 
referral to arbitration where necessary,274 it also provides benefits to the company and complainant. 
ADR gives the opportunity to resolve grievance outside litigation arena where the initial dialogue-
based approach could not settle the said complaint.275 Compared to litigations, ADR is arguably 
cheaper, quicker, non-adversarial, may provide appropriate remedy, and is subject to the choice of 
the parties.276However, using ADR mechanism such as Arbitration may serve to exclude recourse to 
other grievance mechanisms because of the binding nature of arbitration decisions, unless the parties 
agree otherwise.277  
 
VII. Follow up and close-out. 
The follow-up and close-out form the final procedural step in the grievance management. The 
resolution agreed upon with the complainant need to be implemented within the specified time agreed 
in the final agreement of settlement.278 The complaint should then be close-out unless the 
complainant has further concern regarding the same grievance.279 Further concern from the 
complainant will signify that the grievance is not resolved satisfactorily. Therefore, adjustments may 
be necessary to ensure that the root causes of the complaints are addressed, and outcomes are 
consistent with mutual agreement with the complainant.280Implementing the agreed outcomes 
promptly and availing opportunity to make adjustments where necessary, show being accountable, in 
line with the UNGP’s criteria of legitimacy,281 and the Petroleum Act’s standard of accountability.282 
 
Where the complaint is a subject of appeal within the company or being considered before other 
mechanisms, the company should create a system of tracking the grievances to facilitate follow-up of 
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the complaints to their logical conclusion.283 Experiences from the resolution implementation and 
follow-up should be diligently documented via a system of documentation created by the company. 
The record may be used to further refine the grievance handling process in accordance with the best 
practice principle of continuous improvement or to inform future responses to similar grievances.284 
Documenting the experiences to identify lessons for improving the mechanism and preventing future 
grievances and harms will also reflect compliance with the UNGP’s criteria of having a source to 
facilitate continuous learning of the mechanism.285 
 
4.4. Phase IV: Test, review and disseminate the mechanism 
The phase of testing, reviewing and publishing the mechanism follows, once approval of the design 
and governance frameworks of the mechanism is done by the company’s top management and there 
is support from the external stakeholders.286 The governance framework is an independent but 
complementary document that guides the management of the entire grievance mechanism 
processes.287 The framework basically contains three elements: (I) reference to the statement of 
policy upon which the grievance mechanism is premised; (II) the standard operating procedure, which 
specifies the constitution and roles of  the operating personnel, adequate resources plan, interface 
with other grievance mechanisms, and oversight process;288 and (III) where to operate the mechanism 
from (either at the company-level or at the site/project level).289 Studies support that the preference is 
at the project site because complaints are most effectively addressed when the grievance process is 
located at the area of business operation.290However, the duty to make the mechanism work needs to 
be mainstreamed throughout the business operations and the corporate office to ensure collaborative 
resolution of grievance.291  
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Testing the mechanism is done in accordance with the procedural steps of grievance management 
and the governance framework.292 It would require running fictitious complaints through the grievance 
mechanism and trying the functionality of the channels of submitting and receiving grievances, such 
as the designated email address, the company website, and toll-free telephone.293 Where the 
channels are not working, they are reviewed and fixed to ensure that they are credible and 
functional.294  
 
Where every step is fully functional, the mechanism is publicized.295 It is officially introduced to the 
company and potential users on a wide scale.296 Laura Curtze and Steve Gibbons (2017) explained 
that grievance mechanism could fail to be effective from the start where the intended users lack 
information about its existence. The company must provide sufficient resources and priority to 
communication and awareness-raising to ensure the grievance mechanism is known and understood 
by the stakeholders.297 In order for communication and outreach activities to be successful, the 
information about a grievance mechanism in a language understandable to the users, needs to reach 
them.298  
 
Depending on the local circumstances at the material time, some of the ways for wider dissemination 
of the mechanism include: the use of posters and leaflets; public meetings; newsletter articles; local 
radios; and other appropriate means.299 The dissemination should be in a language understandable to 
the users, let the potential users know how and where to access the mechanism, and may need to be 
continuous, to achieve wider coverage.300  
 
Testing, reviewing and dissemination of the mechanism ensures the proper functioning of the 
mechanism and wider knowledge about the mechanism, to enable accessibility in line with the UNGP 
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criteria of accessibility,301 as well as the petroleum Act’s standard that requires corporations to inform 
the affected communities about the mechanism.302 
 
4.5. Phase V: Implement, Monitor, Report, and Learn 
The full implementation of the mechanism is the next stage after the mechanism is launched and 
disseminated.303 The mechanism is implemented in accordance with the design components and 
governance framework of the mechanism.304 Implementing the mechanisms essentially require skilled 
personnel and adequate resources. The success of grievance mechanisms substantially depends on 
having skilled personnel trained in conflict resolution. The personnel may be sourced from the 
company, community or outside.305 Effective resolution of grievances depends on how they are 
handled, as a study explained, grievances brought before the mechanism do not need to be 
inherently bad or good, but the manner in which they are managed can spring a success story or will 
have serious knock-on implications both for those impacted and the company’s operations and 
reputation.  Having adequate resources on the other hand is crucial, as Cathal Doyle (2015) 
explained, “if the decision to establish OLGM is not accompanied by the allocation of sufficient 
resources to ensure effective functioning, staff levels tend to be inadequate, training insufficient, and 
there is generally inadequate appreciation of the relationship between grievance mechanisms and risk 
management.” 306 
 
To monitor the performance of the mechanism, the company needs to have in place a monitoring 
mechanism managed by a designated company officer to routinely update the data base about the 
mechanism performance.307 The monitoring identifies the patterns of complaints, the volume of 
complaints, the common and recurrent complaints, response times, actual outcomes, and feedback 
from stakeholders about their satisfaction with the process.308 The monitoring data forms the records 
for continuous learning, assessing the effectiveness of the mechanism, improving the effectiveness of 
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the mechanism, and a resource that informs the formulation of adverse impacts mitigation 
mechanisms to prevent future occurrences.309 
 
In the spirit of transparency and accountability, in line with the UNGP’s principles of transparency and 
legitimacy,310 and the Petroleum Act’s principles of transparency and accountability,311 it is 
encouraged that the results of the monitoring are reported and shared with the wider stakeholders.312 
Reporting to the stakeholders is significant to get their feedback to devise ways to make the grievance 
mechanism more effective, and bolster local trust in the mechanism .313 
 
Principle 31(g) requires that the measure for identifying lessons (monitoring mechanism) should be a 
continuous source of learning. Fulfilling this criterion requires the company to positively take the 
monitoring data and feedback from the wider stakeholder, as a learning resource to assist in making 
sound decision for the periodic review of the mechanism and informing management decisions 
towards formulating adverse impacts mitigation mechanisms.314 It would also mean that the 
monitoring data be kept for a considerable period of time since it is for continuous use. The UNGP is 
silent on the period of time for keeping the data, but the Petroleum Act requires the documented 
records be kept for ‘at least 20 years’ from the date of making them.315 
 
4.6. Conclusion 
The chapter reveals that the OLGMS’s establishment and implementation can be done through five 
basic phases. Compliance the required standards, is achieved by reflecting the standards across the 
phases. The standards are reflected through articulated action-guidance. Although the standards are 
‘inter-related and should be taken as a whole,’ all of them are not fulfillable at once in a phase.316  
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CHAPTER V: BENEFITS AND CHALLENGES 
5.0. Introduction 
This chapter explains the potential benefits of OLGMs, the challenges companies may face in the 
process of establishing and implementing OLGMs, and the challenges users may experience while 
accessing remedies via the mechanism. 
 
5.1. Potential benefits of OLGMs  
 
Enhance relationship and trust 
OLGM designed with the involvement of the affected groups enhances company’s relations and trust 
with the stakeholders.317 The relationship, in turn, contributes to the prevention of future disputes, 
thereby reduces grievances.318  
 
Prevent grievances from compounding and escalating 
The mechanisms enable grievances to be addressed early and directly by the company, thereby 
preventing them from compounding and escalating.319 This reduces the company’s operational and 
reputational risks.320 Neglecting to resolve community issues earlier may lead to protest and 
suspension of operations, which harm the business.321 Thus, where there is OLGM in existence, 
community issues can be remediated earlier to avoid the risks.322 
 
Resolve disputes speedily, inexpensively, and fairly 
OLGM increases the likelihood of resolving disputes speedily, inexpensively, and fairly, with possible 
solutions that may satisfy both sides.323 This is because the mechanism focuses on dialogue as the 
approach to address and resolve grievances, and accessing, is meant to be at no cost to the users.324 
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Helps companies obtain essential information for improvement 
The monitoring data on the mechanism’s performance gives the company essential information on 
trends and patterns in complaints which can feed into their ongoing human rights due diligence 
process.325 This enables the companies to respond and adapt their business practices to prevent 
future human rights abuses from re-occurring.326 
 
Guarantee access to remedy 
OLGMs guarantee access to remedy to victims in circumstances where State-based mechanisms are 
ineffective, non-existence, slow, or/and costly.327 This helps in filling the gap for remediation or 
complementing the State-based mechanisms.328  
 
5.2. Possible challenges companies may experience 
 
Managing expectations 
Establishing and implementing OLGM involves a variety of stakeholders. They may view the purpose 
and expected outcomes of the mechanism differently.329 Managing the different needs, interests, 
perspectives and priorities of stakeholders in the processes and outcomes, may be challenging.330  
 
Building trust in the mechanism 
Companies could face the challenge of building trust in the mechanism. The stakeholders may 
question the legitimacy and independence of OLGMs.331 This is because the companies are the 
designers and administrators of the mechanisms, which make OLGMs vulnerable to being suspected 
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of being biased or illegitimate sources of remedy for harms.332 The suspicion leads to mistrust and 
reduces the use of the mechanism.333  
 
Resources concern 
The administration of OLGM is resource intensive.334 yet, a company may have other functions on 
which it wishes to focus its resources, and to which its OLGM is an adjunct.335 Therefore, limited 
resources may be a barrier to implementing the mechanism effectively.  
 
Determining reparations 
The UNGP require remedies to accord with internationally recognized human rights’ standards.336 
International human rights law, on the other hand, guarantees reparations should be proportional to 
the gravity of the harm suffered.337 However, they say little about how to speciﬁcally assess 
remedies.338 This presents the challenge of determining what specifically amounts to proportionate or 
satisfactory reparations.339   
 
Integrating the OLGMs with the local cultural practices 
In developing OLGMs, there is a potential challenge of how to align the OLGM process with the 
customary justice system, as local communities have traditional approaches to resolving disputes that 
may not be based on universal principles.340 For example, in South Sudan, local communities have 
existing dispute resolution systems through their traditional authorities, recognized under customary 
law and the Local Government Act 2009.341 The Petroleum Act explicitly requires a company-based 
grievance mechanism to be culturally appropriate.342 This implies that existing cultural practices need 
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to be incorporated into the OLGMs process. There is, however, no clarification on how the practices 
should be incorporated in the OLGMs. 
 
5.3. Possible challenges users of the OLGMs may experience 
Limited information about the mechanism 
Awareness about the mechanism may not reach every potential user, especially those in remote 
areas.343 Such persons may not find it obvious where to go to seek redress and what procedure to 
follow.344 Complainants may also face the challenge of filing a complaint, as they may be required to 
meet burdensome filing requirements, arbitrary deadlines, and language barriers.345 The RAID study 
described such challenges as erecting barrier to remedy for violations.346 
 
A barrier to accessing other mechanisms 
Some companies may use the OLGM as the primary, sole and the final mean to obtain remedy.’347 
Therefore, complainants may find themselves being prohibited from accessing other mechanisms. 
Doyle Cathal (2015),348 gave an example of Barrick Gold Corporation’s grievance mechanism at 
Porgera mine in Papua New Guinea that used OLGM to limit access to judicial remedies to victims of 
corporate human rights violations. This limitation leads to a negative implication in terms of 
guaranteeing access to remedies.349  
 
Power Imbalance 
While using the OLGM, complainants may be at a distinct power imbalance with the company.350 This 
is due to the fact that the company has total control of the mechanism’s implementation and the 
outcome of all grievances.351 The RAID study explained, the absolute control over the grievance 
                                                 
343 Caroline (n 181) 14. 
344 SOMO (n 331) 4. 
345 Ibid. 
346 The RAID Report (n 50) 9. 
347 Cathal (n 6) 58-59. 
348 Ibid. 
349 Ibid. 
350 SOMO (n 331) 4. 
351 The RAID Report (n 50) 5. 
59 
 
process means the company can control access to information, access to expert assistance, and can 
disregard its own procedure to the prejudice of complainants.352 
 
Unsatisfactory outcomes 
Meeting the legal standards does not guarantee  an outcome or  provision of a satisfactory remedy.353 
Companies are therefore more inclined to determine the outcomes of grievance according to their 
interest.354 The most likely outcome is rejection or offer of much less remedy.355 This frustrates the 
users who may subsequently perceive the OLGM as a worthless mechanism. 
 
5.4. Conclusion 
The Chapter finds that OLGM benefits both the company and complainant. However, the company 
and users may face some challenges in relation to the OLGM. The possible solutions are provided in 
Chapter Six. 
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CHAPTER SIX: CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
6.0. Introduction  
The research question this study pursued to answer is ‘how can oil and gas companies establish and 
implement effective OLGMs in compliance with the standards of the Petroleum Act 2012, the UNGP, 
and other best practice principles in the context of South Sudan?’ While using an analysis of primary 
and secondary sources, and best practices guidelines, the question is answered by specifying and 
examining the essential phases through which the OLGM’s establishment and implementation can be 
achieved. It is further answered by reflecting the standards within the phases. The reflection is done 
by the articulation of action-guidance that the companies should perform to achieve the standards.  
  
This final Chapter draws the main findings of each chapter while considering the study’s objectives, 
followed by a conclusion drawn from the study. The Chapter then makes recommendations in line 
with Chapter Five’s findings, and for potential future research.  
 
6.1. Main findings and arguments of the study. 
 
In Chapter One, the study explored the efforts for ensuring corporate accountability in the context of 
business activities and the motivation for the research. The chapter reveals that internationally, the 
UNGP confirmed corporations’ responsibility to establish and implement OLGMs. The responsibility 
applies to all companies world-wide. Nationally, the South Sudan’s Petroleum Act also obligates the 
oil and corporations to establish ‘dispute resolution mechanisms’, construed to include OLGMs 
analogous to the UNGP’s. The chapter further revealed that despite the legal call, evidence of 
corporate human rights abuses, and usefulness of OLGMs, less or no progress is being made by the 
companies to create the mechanism which has in effect increasingly hindered the right to effective 
remedies. Potentially, there is limited understanding of how to create and implement the OLGMs. 
Hence the motivation for the study. 
 
Chapter Two on literature review, establishes the theoretical basis upon which all the Chapters 
benefited from. Particularly, the Chapter establishes the understanding of OLGMs; grievance 
resolution approaches of the mechanisms; designing and implementing the mechanisms; experiences 
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with regards to the mechanisms; the standards for the mechanisms; and the justification for the 
mechanisms. The chapter also discovers a knowledge gap in creating and operating OLGMs in the 
context of specific countries and local environment, upon which this study focused to fill. Chapter Two 
fulfils the study’s objective on literature review. 
 
Chapter Three provided the overview of the right to effective remedies and OLGMs. The Chapter 
found the obligation of corporations under international law to provide effectives remedies is realised 
through the adoption of domestic legislation. In the South Sudan’s context, it is found the Petroleum 
Act obligates oil and gas corporations to create dispute mechanisms to address grievances against 
the corporations. The Chapter also found that with or without  the national law, the normative basis to 
create OLGMs still exist under the UNGP’s corporate responsibility to respect human rights. The 
responsibility exists autonomously. However, it is argued that its independency does not remove or 
lessen a corresponding corporate duty under national law. Therefore, developing and operating 
OLGMs in accordance with both the Petroleum Act and the UNGP is consistent with international 
standards.  
 
The Chapter also reveals the standards for effective OLGMs are expressed under Section 94 of the 
Petroleum Act and Principle 31 of UNGP. Though the UNGP’s standards are more expansive than 
the Petroleum Act’s, they are observed to be consistent with the UNGP’s because in addition to its 
requirements, the Petroleum statute recognizes compliance with the highest international standards 
(the UNGP). Additionally, it is argued that the standards under the Petroleum Act and the UNGP are 
not conclusive. Emerging best practices such as ‘proportionality, empowering and continual 
improvement’ may be used to supplement them.356 Hence, the standards of the Petroleum statute, the 
UNGP, and other best practice principles are discovered as the standards for creating and 
administering effective OLGMs in the context to South Sudan.  
 
The Chapter further disclosed the right to effective remedies is comprised of procedural and 
substantive aspects. OLGMs forms part of the procedural aspect. The substantive component, on the 
other hand, concerns the actual relief, sometimes referred to as reparations. The OLGM is a channel 
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to obtaining reparations, and the provision of both the OLGM and reparations are guided by the 
principle of proportionality. Every human rights violation deserve remediation and reparation(s) 
proportionate to the harm to ensure meaningful respect for human rights. Chapter Three fulfils the 
study’s objective to review the right to remedies and OLGMs. 
 
Chapter Four sets to examine how to establish and implement OLGMs in compliance with the 
required standards. While drawing on the work of others, the chapter discovers that the establishment 
and implementation can be done through five essential phases: (I) the initial step of considering key 
issues; (II) designing the mechanism; (III) creating the procedural steps of managing grievances; (iv) 
testing, review and disseminating; and (v) implementing, monitoring and learning. Each of the phases, 
in turn, consists of steps or processes. It is reasoned that the five phases are practicable and 
realisable to the oil and gas companies of all sizes, and are capable to adequately produce effective 
OLGMs compatible to the business, local context and legal requirements. However, overlooking a 
phase may lead to a poorly established OLGMs because the phases are mutually interdependent in 
that subsequent phases rely on preceding phases for implementation.  
 
Compliance with the required standards is achieved by reflecting the standards across the various 
phases. The standards are reflected through articulated action-guidance companies should perform to 
fulfil the standards. Although the standards are ‘inter-related and should be taken as a whole’,357 all of 
them are not fulfillable at once in a phase. One or more standards are met in a phase, and the others 
in other phases. Chapter Four fulfils the study’s objective to examine the OLGM’s establishment and 
implementation in line with the required standards. 
 
Chapter Five elaborated on the benefits of OLGM, and the challenges in relation to the OLGMs. The 
study found OLGMs present potential benefits ranging from relationship enhancement to 
guaranteeing access to remedies. However, the companies may experience some challenges such 
as managing expectations of the users and resources constraints. On the other hand, the users may 
experience certain challenges such as limited information about  the mechanism and  barrier to 
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accessing other mechanisms. These challenges may affect the effectiveness of the mechanism, but 
possible solutions are provided in the recommendations section. 
 
The final objective of the study was to conclude the study and develop recommendations. Chapter 
Six achieves this. 
 
6.2. Conclusion 
It is drawn that this research builds on and strengthens existing knowledge on establishing and 
implementing OLGMs, with additional information. The study examines the creation and operation of 
OLGMs from the perspective of the standards of the Petroleum Act, the UNGP, and other best 
practice principles. Arguably, this could provide a more functional OLGMs because of the binding 
nature of national law and influential nature of the international norms. Creating and implementing 
OLGMs contrary to the national law would mean violating the law which could attract sanctions. 
Because of its influence, the international norm can supplement the provisions of national law in the 
efforts to create OLGM consistent with international standards.  
 
The companies can achieve the OLGM’s creation and administration in compliance with the required 
standards through the five (5) essential phases. It is reasoned that the processes are practicable and 
realisable to the oil and gas companies of all sizes, and are capable to adequately produce effective 
OLGMs compatible to the business, local context and legal requirements. However, overlooking a 
phase may lead to a poorly established OLGMs because they are mutually interdependent for the 
reason that subsequent phases rely on preceding ones for implementation.  
 
In realising the processes, the companies and users may experience some challenges that may affect 
the mechanism’s effectiveness in practice. The companies and users may mainly experience 
resources constraint and the barrier of accessing other mechanisms, respectively. It is recommended 
the mechanism be set within an existing  business unit than setting it as an independent structure to 
minimise resources burden, and access to alternative grievance mechanisms be guaranteed in the 
mechanism’s governance framework to mitigate against using the mechanism as a primary and final 
channel to resolve grievances. 
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This study contributes to the global effort to ensuring and improving access to effective remedies 
through establishing and implementing effective non-State-based grievance mechanisms. The study 
is examined as a practical instrument and using it to guide and effect the creation and implementation 
of OLGMs would be a suitable step for oil and gas companies in South Sudan to fulfil their corporate 
responsibility to ensuring the individuals and communities negatively impacted by their activities have 
access to effective remedies.   
 
6.3. Recommendations 
Possible solutions to the challenges that companies might experience in relation to the design and 
implementation of OLGM:  
 
The challenge of managing stakeholders’ expectations during the process could be addressed by 
clearly defining the scope of the mechanism. Well defined scope will eliminate the expectations not 
falling within the mechanism’s mandate.358 In addition, providing explanation to the stakeholders 
about the limitations faced, such as resources concern for the operation of the mechanism may help 
keep their expectation within what is manageable.359 
 
The mistrust of stakeholders could be addressed by building trust with them. Trust could be built by 
inclusively engaging the intended users to get involved in the design and implementation as required 
under Principle 31(h) of the UNGP. The engagement will promote a ‘sense of ownership, trust and 
respect for the mechanism.’360  
 
The concern of resources could be solved by considering the administration of the OLGM as a 
company’s priority. The priority commitment should be guaranteed in the ‘governance 
framework.’361The resources pressure may also be reduced by institutionalizing the mechanism within 
an existing business unit rather than creating it as an independent structure. ‘So long as it is clear 
                                                 
358 IPIECA (n 42) 17. 
359 Community Places (n 152) 6. 
360 IPIECA (n 42) 17. 
361 CAO (n 41) 46. 
65 
 
who is responsible for each procedure and how company staff should interact with each other,’ the 
mechanisms could be run efficiently with minimum resources.362 
 
The issue of determining remedies obtained through OLGM require further international guidance to 
reconcile the disagreement on what amounts to appropriate or satisfactory remedies.363 Additionally, 
the challenge may be solved by equating the remedy obtained via the mechanism to what the victim 
would have gotten under their traditional justice and civil courts.364 
 
The challenge of integrating the mechanisms with the local cultural practices could be solved by 
aligning existing traditional dispute mechanisms to the OLGM’s ADR mechanisms such as mediation 
and negotiation. The ADR mechanisms ‘involve engagement of neutral third parties,’365 therefore, it is 
recommended the traditional authorities be used as mediators and negotiators.  
 
Possible solutions to the challenges that the users might experience when seeking remedies via the 
OLGM:  
 
The challenge of limited information about the mechanism may be solved by ‘wider awareness raising 
to ensure the mechanism is known and understood by the stakeholders.’366 The outreach activities 
should be in a language, understandable to the users. Some of the ways for wider dissemination 
include; the use of simplified handbooks, posters and leaflets, public meetings, newsletter articles, 
local radios and other appropriate means in the local context.367 The dissemination may need to be 
continuous and should let the potential users know how and where to access the mechanism.368 
 
Companies should ensure OLGMs never encumber users from seeking recourse from the company’s 
internal appeal process or other available mechanisms such as the State-based grievance 
mechanisms. The company should clearly indicate in the governance framework the alternative 
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channels for recourse for issues that cannot or should not be addressed through the OLGM. The 
alternative channels should also be made known to the users.   
 
The challenge of power imbalance could be remediated by facilitating the complainant with 
information relevant to his/her case. It may also be addressed by allowing the complainant to be 
assisted in the processes by a representative of choice, who would protect his/her interest.369 Utilizing 
neutral third parties to facilitate dialogue on resolving grievance may also contribute to addressing the 
issue of power imbalance. 
 
To guaranty satisfactory outcomes, there should be transparency and fairness in handling the 
grievances via the mechanism. This would require having independent, trusted and neutral personnel 
to administer the mechanisms.    
 
6.4. Limitations 
This research has been limited by inadequate time and scarce international standards especially on 
the processes of establishing and implementing OLGMs. As result, leading guidelines that reflect 
international best practices of reputable Institutions such as those of the IPIECA, CAO, ICMM and 
IFC, have been used. The limited time and scarce information limited the conduct of more in-depth 
research.  
 
6.5. Potential future research 
This study examines establishing and implementing OLGMs ‘administered by companies alone’. 
Further studies are needed to examine OLGMs administered in collaboration with other stakeholders.  
New research could also be done on developing and administering OLGMs in the context of specific 
businesses in other countries in view of the UNGP and relevant domestic legislation. The studies 
would be significant to contribute to guaranteeing access to remedies via OLGMs.  
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